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CHAPTER I 
 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
Entrepreneurs often lack the financial resources needed to effectively exploit 
opportunities (Aldrich & Ruef, 2006). To support their startup and growth needs, 
entrepreneurs have traditionally sought additional capital from external sources such as 
financial institutions, angel investors, or venture capital.  In attempting to understand how 
entrepreneurs may access external financial capital, past research has often focused on 
network attributes. For example, a number of studies have examined how entrepreneurs 
communicate social capital (e.g., Cohen & Dean, 2005) and how social capital may 
facilitate access to funds (e.g., Zimmerman, 2008). However, this approach often 
overlooks the extent to which some individuals or ventures may face social biases, 
discrimination, marginalization, or other forms of social exclusion (e.g., Bask, 2005; 
Wetterberg, 2007). Indeed, it is widely documented that some groups may have less 
access to resources, such as financial capital, as compared to others (e.g., Blackburn & 
Ram, 2006; Buvinić, Mazza, & Deutsch, 2004). 
At its root, social exclusion emphasizes how benefits are inequitably distributed 
(Buvinić et al., 2004). Social exclusion may reflect voluntary choices of individuals, 
interests or relationships between actors, or system distortions such as discrimination 
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(Bhalla & Lapeyre, 1997). At the level of the individual, social exclusion may arise due 
to readily visible or known social status indicators such as ethnicity, gender, or perhaps 
even education (e.g., Bhalla & Lapeyre, 1997; Marlow & Patton, 2005). For example, 
cultural biases may cause resource providers to view individuals that possess low-levels 
of formal education as ‘poor investments,’ and, in turn, become less likely to provide 
them with needed funds (e.g., Coleman, 2004). Similarly, when they are able to obtain 
external capital, women and ethnic-minority entrepreneurs often receive lower levels of 
funding as compared to their male and/or ethnic-majority counterparts (e.g., Blackburn & 
Ram, 2006; Buvinić et al., 2004). 
Representing a relatively new source of external financial capital, crowdfunding 
refers to an open call, through an internet-based platform, for the allocation of financial 
capital to support of a specific purpose (Davis & Webb, 2012). Unlike traditional funding 
conduits, which are generally dominated by a relatively small number of professional 
investors, crowdfunding platforms are ‘democratic’ funding conduits, which enable 
laypersons from the general public to act as investors (i.e., henceforth, funders). In 
general, crowdfunding platforms are viewed as an alternative source of funding (Dapp, 
2013), which are guided by the mission of helping others and fostering creativity (e.g., 
Indiegogo, 2014a; Kickstarter, 2014b). As such, many view crowdfunding as a potential 
boon for entrepreneurs, such as women, that might otherwise be excluded from accessing 
external funds (Overly, 2013; Thorpe, 2014). However, to date, no research has been 
conducted to understand how status indicators, such as gender, influence funding 
performance of traditionally excluded entrepreneurs and/or ventures on crowdfunding 
platforms. 
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Drawing on past research on underdog psychology (Vandello, Goldschmied, & 
Richards, 2007), social exclusion (Buvinić et al., 2004) and social status (Bitektine, 
2011). I develop a model of funder decision-making which suggests that funders are more 
likely to provide capital to entrepreneurs than are members of traditionally excluded 
groups. Similar to socially excluded groups, underdogs refer to individuals or groups that 
are at a disadvantage, which may be due to some level of injustice or power imbalance, 
and expected to lose (Merriam-Webster, 2014). Due to a number of psychological 
factors, such as a need for fairness (Folger & Kass, 2000), individuals are often motivated 
to support disadvantaged others in underdog situations (Vandello et al., 2007). The 
likelihood that this motivation will materialize through action is increased in contexts 
where potential costs or risks to the supporter are low (Kim et al., 2008), such as in 
crowdfunding. Indeed, unlike traditional investment contexts, resource providers in 
crowdfunding generally provide low levels of capital and, in turn, assume relatively low 
levels of risk. To test this theory, I employ a random sample of 300 ventures that sought 
crowdfunding during a four-year period between January of 2009 and December of 2012. 
This research seeks to make a number of important contributions to both theory 
and research. First, existing research has primarily examined the extent to which 
entrepreneurs’ membership in an excluded (underdog) group may hinder their ability to 
successfully garner needed resources (e.g., Coleman, 2004; Lerner, Brush, & Hiscrich, 
1997). However, in the current study, I suggest that membership in an excluded 
(underdog) group may actually enhance entrepreneurs’ ability to successfully garner 
financial capital through crowdfunding. In doing so, I extend previous research on 
underdog psychology within exchange-based situations (c.f., Batson et al., 1997). Next, 
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while previous research has typically viewed one’s membership in an excluded group as 
carrying a consistently negative value, I suggest that the value assigned to a given status 
indicator is influenced by the decision environment. In doing so, I advance theoretical 
understanding of how the norms and/or mission of a given funding context may influence 
the decisions of resource providers. Finally, by suggesting that entrepreneurs may 
experience social exclusion due to industry affiliation (i.e., vis-a-ve funding 
requirements), I highlight a potential source of social exclusion, which has thus far been 
overlooked.   
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CHAPTER II 
 
 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
 
 
 
Section 1: The Crowdfunding Context 
Section 1.1: Rise and history of crowdfunding 
Crowdfunding refers to the issuance of an open call, through an internet-based 
platform, for the allocation of financial capital to support a specific purpose (Davis & 
Webb, 2012). Crowdfunding is not a new phenomenon, but rather a new take on a 
relatively old idea. Artists, inventors, composers, and others have long relied on funding 
from various backers to produce new goods and services (Steinberg, 2012). In this same 
spirit, internet-based crowdfunding platforms are generally viewed as an alternative 
source of funding (Dapp, 2013), guided by the mission of helping others and fostering 
creativity (e.g., Indiegogo, 2014a; Kickstarter, 2014b). Unlike many traditional sources of 
funding, crowdfunding platforms are ‘democratic’ funding conduits, which enable 
laypersons from the general public to act as funders, with each individual providing as 
little as $1. As such, crowdfunding platforms generally provide entrepreneurs with a 
relatively low level of funding (i.e., a few thousand dollars) from a relatively large 
number of funders (Davis & Webb, 2012).  
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The emergence of crowdfunding has been supported by a confluence of trends. 
Most notably, the advent and widespread use of the internet, particularly in the areas of 
communication (e.g., Subrahmanyam, Reich, Waechter, & Espinoza, 2008), online 
commerce (e.g., Li, Srinivasn, and Baohong, 2009), and advertising (Goldfarb and 
Tucker, 2011), has facilitated increased consumer comfort and confidence in transacting 
online without being able to see and experience final products. Additionally, In the U.S. 
and elsewhere, a vibrant entrepreneurial culture supported by popular media (e.g., 
Dragon’s Den, Shark Tank) has increased interest in entrepreneurs’ activities and the 
desire to support entrepreneurs (e.g., Spinelli and Adams, 2012). Reflecting this desire, a 
recent report by Crowdsourcing.org and the World Bank, states that crowdfunding 
generated $5.1 billion in funding in 2013 and suggests that it will surpass $300 billion in 
funding transactions by 2025. Further, both the number of platforms and the level of 
funding activity have consistently grown at rates of 200% to 500% per year (EquityNet, 
2014). 
Given the tremendous growth experienced by the crowdfunding industry, and a 
general lack of governmental oversight (i.e., as compared to traditional contexts such as 
venture capital), industry leaders have also taken steps to manage user confidence and 
create some level of industry-wide formality. Specifically, crowdsourcing.org, which is a 
neutral professional organization dedicated to crowdfunding, recently implemented the 
Crowdfunding Accreditation for Platform Standards (CAPS) program (Crowdsourcing, 
2014). The program is supported by a council of leading platform operators and industry 
experts who conduct annul reviews of crowdfunding platforms with the hopes of 
fostering high standards of performance as the nascent industry continues to develop 
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(Crowdsourcing, 2014). 
Section 1.2: Crowdfunding: The process  
In general, crowdfunding begins through the production of information that is to 
be made available to prospective funders. While crowdfunding platforms provide 
templates, the crowdfunding entrepreneur is given relative autonomy in determining the 
general content and presentation of the ‘informal prospectus’ that is to be presented to 
prospective funders. The informal prospectus consists of information, such as a general 
synopsis of the venture itself, the background of the management team, the funding goal, 
and the investment-reward structure. This information is then overlaid into a ‘venture-
funding page’ within the online crowdfunding platform. This page serves as a virtual road 
show that is open to the general public, and is the central point of communication 
between the entrepreneur and prospective funders. During this ‘virtual roadshow,’ 
prospective funders can evaluate the venture-relevant information prior to making a 
funding decision. Crowdfunding entrepreneurs are limited to communicating through 
non-financial mechanisms, and funders are rewarded through various extrinsic tangible 
rewards (i.e., a limited version of the venture’s product) or intrinsic ‘gifts’ (i.e., a thank 
you).  
There currently exist a wide array of crowdfunding platforms. As of 2013, it was 
estimated that over 500 crowdfunding platforms were in current operation, and there 
existed over 9,000 registered domain names related to crowdfunding (Caldbeck, 2013). 
Given that rewards-based platforms do not allow entrepreneurs and funders to engage in 
equity-based exchange, they do not face the myriad of regulatory pressures typical of 
traditional investment conduits. As such, the rules associated with crowdfunding (i.e., 
  
  8
both for entrepreneurs and funders) often vary by platform. Given the potential 
implications associated with variation in rules governing factors such as pricing or fund 
allocation, differences between platforms may represent an important area of concern for 
both entrepreneurs and funders alike.  
Perhaps two of the most well-known, and largest, crowdfunding platforms are 
Kickstarter.com and Indiegogo.com (e.g., Hullinger, 2014). While each platform shares a 
similar purpose, the rules governing the two platforms differ in many areas; thus, making 
them an excellent case comparison. To begin, one of the most salient differences can be 
observed in the rules governing platform access. Kickstarter requires that entrepreneurs 
create something that can be ‘shared with the world’ (Kickstarter, 2014c). In other words, 
individuals cannot employ Kickstarter as a way to fund a project meant only for personal 
enjoyment. Further, the platform does not enable entrepreneurs to seek funds for charity, 
to offer potential funders financial incentives, or to support ventures involving prohibited 
products, services, or rewards. Prohibited items include: products or services that are 
illegal, heavily regulated, or potentially dangerous to funders, and rewards that are not 
created by the entrepreneur seeking funds (Kickstarter, 2014d). Alternatively, Indiegogo 
enables entrepreneurs to seek funds for a wide variety of ventures; generally only 
excluding those associated with illegal activities, heavily regulated industries (e.g., 
alcohol, tobacco, or firearms), or those seeking to provide funders with financial rewards 
(Indiegogo, 2014c).  
Next, variation also exists in terms of rules governing the funding process itself, 
as well as the cost of fundraising. Kickstarter operates on an ‘all or nothing’ model, such 
that entrepreneurs who fail to meet their requested funding goal receive nothing. Further, 
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Kickstarter charges a platform fee equivalent to 5% of the funds raised and the third-party 
payment company Amazon charges entrepreneurs an additional credit card processing fee 
of 3-5% (Kickstarter, 2014f). However, if fundraising is not successful, no charges are 
incurred. Alternatively, Indiegogo offers entrepreneurs two funding options: a fixed 
funding model and a flexible funding model (Indiegogo, 2014b). While the fixed funding 
model closely mirrors Kickstarter, in that it is ‘all or nothing,’ the flexible funding model 
allows entrepreneurs to retain the capital raised irrespective of funding goal. With both 
models, Indiegogo charges entrepreneurs a platform fee equivalent to 4% of capital raised 
when the funding goal is met. Alternatively, when the funding goal is not met, this fee 
increases to 9% under the flexible funding model and is eliminated under the fixed 
funding model (Indiegogo, 2014b). Similar to Kickstarter, Indiegogo also uses a third-
party payment processor. Here, PayPal charges 3-5% for PayPal or credit card payments 
and a $25 wire fee for international-based campaigns that raise funds in USD (Indiegogo, 
2014b).  
Finally, despite the variety of differences between the two platforms, they are 
quite similar in their approach to liability. Specifically, neither Kickstarter nor Indiegogo 
are liable for losses incurred by funders (e.g., in terms of rewards), entrepreneurs, or 
other users (Indiegogo, 2014c; Kickstarter, 2014e). However, in an attempt to avoid 
problems the platforms require entrepreneurs to be honest (i.e., provide a pitch which is 
based in facts) and present their plans clearly. For example, when a tangible product is 
being funded, Kickstarter requires that entrepreneurs provide some type of prototype 
(Kickstarter, 2014c). As a second example, Indiegogo states in their ‘terms and 
conditions’ that entrepreneurs are legally bound to fulfill any rewards, and if disputes 
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arise, the platform may provide funders with the entrepreneur’s contact information so 
that the two parties may resolve their dispute (Indiegogo, 2014c).  
Section 1.3: What’s next for crowdfunding? 
 While crowdfunding began as a rewards-based conduit, recent support from U.S.-
regulatory agencies, such as the SEC, are beginning to transform the industry landscape 
(Economist, 2012; Quinn, 2014). With the passage of the 2012 JOBS act, the ability to 
engage in equity-based investment through crowdfunding became reality. While equity-
based investment within the context is currently only open to accredited investors, 
legislation is currently in the works to open equity-based platforms to the layperson 
public (e.g., Quinn, 2014). Although such platforms have taken stronger hold abroad, the 
number and overall impact of equity-based platforms in the U.S. is quickly growing and 
include Crowdfunder, EquityNet, and StartupValley just to name a few. For example, 
since its initial conception, EquityNet has provided entrepreneurs across North America 
with over $240 million in equity, debt, and royalty-based capital (EquityNet, 2014).  
Section 2: Review of Scholarly Research 
Section 2.1: Entrepreneurial finance 
Entrepreneurs often lack the resources needed to effectively exploit opportunities 
(Aldrich & Ruef, 2006), and instead look to external sources of financial capital. While 
entrepreneurship theory often centers on the opportunity (Shane & Venkataraman, 2000), 
the call to gain a deeper understanding of why some individuals, but not others, are able 
to recognize and exploit opportunities clearly suggests the importance of locating, 
acquiring, and directing resources (e.g., Alvarez & Busenitz, 2001). Reflecting this 
general importance, the area of entrepreneurial finance has long represented an important 
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area of scholarly inquiry (e.g., Connelly et al., 2011). To provide an initial foundation for 
the ensuing examination of this research stream, I begin this section by first discussing a 
number of traditional sources of financial capital and how those differ from 
crowdfunding. Afterwards, I provide an in-depth review of extant research examining 
entrepreneurs’ ability to access funding through those traditional sources. 
Sources of funding. Traditionally, entrepreneurs have sought out additional 
financial capital through external sources such as equity investors, debt-based lenders 
such as banks, or individuals within their social network. Yet, of these sources, there are 
four, which typically dominate extant research: debt-based funding, initial public 
offerings (IPO), angel investment, and venture capital (VC). In each of the 
aforementioned contexts, with the exception of debt-based funding, the institutional 
setting is generally dominated by a small number of investors who provide relatively 
large levels of financial capital in exchange for equity ownership in entrepreneurs’ 
ventures. However, each context also differs from the others in areas such as the level of 
standardization, the capital allocation process, and the types of ventures that are served. 
In the following, I provide a brief discussion of each (i.e., debt-based funding, VC, angel 
investment, and IPO), and then discuss the ways in which entrepreneurs’ ability to access 
funding through each may be influenced by a variety of common factors.  
To begin, debt-based funding generally refers to private or public financial 
institutions, which provide debt capital to entrepreneurial ventures in the form of loans. 
Unlike equity-based contexts (e.g., VC, angel, & IPO), entrepreneurs do not give up any 
level of ownership in their ventures in exchange for the capital provided. Instead, 
entrepreneurs are required to pay back the principle amount of capital which was initial 
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provided along with an agreed upon level of interest. Similar to many equity-based 
contexts, the financial institutions that serve as resource providers in the debt capital 
industry are often subject to relatively strong contractual, financial, and regulatory 
constraints (e.g., Barth, Caprio, & Levine, 2008; LaPorta et al., 1997). These constraints 
stem not only from governmental regulatory agencies, but also from the financial 
institutions’ business models, as even many government-backed institutions operate on a 
for-profit basis.  
Scholars and practitioners alike generally view debt-based lenders as representing 
a key component of the entrepreneurial finance landscape (Berger & Udell, 1998). 
Indeed, debt-based capital is often the first type of external funding that entrepreneurs 
seek (Carter et al., 2003). Additionally, given the variety of private and public financial 
institutions which offer debt-based capital, it also represents a much more accessible 
source of funding when compared to equity-based outlets, such as angel investment. 
While equity-based outlets often cater to specific types of ventures (e.g., knowledge-
based industries, high-growth, etc.), debt-based lenders may cater to a variety of different 
types of ventures. For example, the United States Small Business Administration, a 
government backed financial institution, provides loans which range anywhere from $0 to 
$1 million dollars (SBA, 2013). 
While differences may exist, debt-capital providers generally evaluate 
entrepreneurs on the basis of the ‘standard 5 Cs model,’ which refers to: capacity, capital, 
character, conditions, and collateral (Orser & Foster, 1994). In general, the lending 
process begins by filling out an application, which is often tailored to the specific 
offerings of a given financial institution (for a more detailed review on the lending 
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process, see Carter et al., 2007). Applications for debt capital are initially screened by a 
loan officer, and the screening process (if positive) generally results in a meeting between 
the loan officer and the entrepreneur(s). If the loan officer deems the entrepreneur’s case 
to be worthy, a loan proposal is then submitted to the bank’s office of credit control. It is 
at this point that the outcome of the application is determined and terms are set forth if a 
loan is to be made. That being said, the ability to access debt capital is often tied to 
current economic conditions. As such, debt capital may be viewed as a less reliable (or 
accessible) form of external funding during times of economic downturn, such as the 
conditions currently being experienced in the U.S. and abroad (Ferro, 2015).   
Next, venture capitalists refer to professional investors that provide private equity 
investment to entrepreneurial ventures (e.g., Denis, 2004; Gompers, 1995). Venture 
capital firms are often subject to relatively strong contractual, reputational, and financial 
constraints from the partners that VC firms obtain money from (Alperovych, Hübner, & 
Lobet, 2015; Florin, 2005). These constraints stem not only from the strong regulatory 
environment of the industry, but also from the compensation structure of VC firms, 
which are generally tied closely to the financial performance of the firm’s portfolio 
(Metrick & Yasuda, 2010). 
Scholars generally view the reason for VC firms’ existence to stem from their 
ability to reduce the costs associated with informational asymmetries within the 
investment market (Li & Mahoney, 2011). As such, VC firms are often concentrated in 
industries where information concerns are paramount and where VCs have an advantage 
over other types of investors (e.g., individuals) in terms of effectively selecting and 
monitoring investments (Gompers, 1995). Due to this, VC firms are generally viewed as 
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active, rather than passive, investors. Indeed, past research suggests that VCs visit the 
ventures in their portfolios roughly 19 times per year on average (Gorman & Sahlman, 
1989). Through this active investor approach, VCs provide ventures with help in areas 
such as management team composition and compensation systems (Kaplan & Stromberg, 
2003; Sapienza, 1992), professionalization and headhunting (Hellmann & Puri, 2002), or 
operations and strategic management (Hellman & Puri, 2000).  
While variations may exist, it has been suggested that the process through which 
VCs decide (not) to provide capital to a given venture can be broken into four basic 
stages: origination, screening, evaluation, and closing (Fried & Hisrich, 1994). The VC 
investment process begins through origination, which refers to the time at which a 
potential investment (i.e., venture) is located. The number of potential ventures is then 
reduced through screening, and the remaining ventures then go through a lengthy vetting 
process during evaluation. If the VCs deem a venture to be a ‘good’ investment through 
the evaluation process, they move on to the final closing stage (i.e., structuring and post 
investment activities). Unlike many other investment contexts, VCs generally provide 
ventures with financial capital in stages.  In doing so, this enables VCs to not only reduce 
their financial risk on the front end, but also in the long term by allowing for the VCs’ 
active involvement and ongoing evaluation of ventures in their portfolio between 
investment stages. That being said, it is not uncommon for VCs to refuse to provide later 
stages of funding if negative information about the venture is uncovered (Gompers, 
1995). 
In order to maximize their effectiveness, both in terms of identifying new 
investments and empowering existing ones, VCs often draw heavily upon their networks 
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(Davila, Foster, & Gupta, 2003; Hochberg, Ljungqvist, & Lu, 2007). However, these 
networks are often based around geography or industry, and thus the information which 
flows form them tends to contribute to localization of investment (Sorenson & Stuart, 
2001). As such, the availability of VC money is rather dispersed, and thus difficult to 
access by entrepreneurs in many geographic areas or industries (Mason & Harrison, 
1995). To alleviate issues stemming from the dispersion of VC funding, many have 
suggested that entrepreneurs may instead look to sources of informal venture capital, 
such as angel investors (Mason & Harrison, 1995). 
Angel investors generally refer to private (wealthy) individuals or groups who 
provide capital to relatively new or growing ventures (Gompers, 1995). Given the 
relatively informal and often individual nature of the angel investment industry, investors 
often have investment objectives beyond mere profitability. For example, angels may 
consider objectives such as potential income, capital growth, time commitments (e.g., full 
time or part time), or other personal goals (Paul, Whittam, & Wyper, 2007). As compared 
to formal venture capital, angel investors are generally more willing to provide capital to 
early-stage ventures and, as such, are increasingly viewed as an important component of 
the equity investment landscape (Becker-Blease & Sohl, 2007; Maxwell, Jeffrey, & 
Levesque, 2011). Indeed, data suggests that angels invest up to 16 times as often in 
nascent ventures as compared to venture capitalists (Sohl, 2007).  
As of 2000, it was estimated that the size of the venture capital market to be 
roughly $48 billion USD (not counting corporate venture capital, as those figures are not 
generally made public), while the market for angel investment was estimated to be at 
roughly $100 billion USD (Denis, 2004). That being said, the average level of capital 
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provided by angel investors is significantly lower as compared to VCs (Denis, 2004; 
Maula, Autio, & Arenius, 2005). As such, it can easily be seen that the number of angel 
investors far exceeds the number of VCs within the market. Yet despite their relatively 
large numbers, the ability of entrepreneurs to access capital through angels has been often 
cited as necessarily limited (Riding et al., 1997). Perhaps contributing to this, is the often 
informal nature of angel investment which has lead to the relatively ‘invisible nature’ of 
the industry (Mason & Harrison, 2008). That being said, scholars have noted that the 
market is becoming increasingly visible as it moves away from one dominated purely by 
individuals and towards a more professional model of organized syndicates (May, 2002; 
May & O’Halloran, 2003).   
Despite its relative informality, angel investment shares a number of 
commonalities with formal venture capital. For example, after investment occurs angel 
investors actively monitor their investments and often take a hands-on role in the venture 
in an attempt to provide value through their personal skills and experience (Harrison & 
Mason, 1992; Madill, Haines, & Riding, 2005). Additionally, angels also often follow a 
sequential pattern of investment that may be split into five stages: familiarization stage, 
screening stage, bargaining stage, managing stage, and harvesting stage (Paul et al., 
2007). Thus, just as in the VC context, angel investors first screen ventures, then go 
through a vetting process, and finally fund / continue a relationship with the ventures 
deemed to be a ‘good investment.’ In sum, both venture capital and angel investment play 
important roles in the private equity landscape. While each differs in areas such as 
formality and investment preferences, both types of investor may provide entrepreneurs 
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with valuable resources and enable ventures to more easily reach the next type of equity 
financing known as the initial public offering (IPO).   
Unlike angel investment and venture capital, which are both private, the initial 
public offering (IPO) context refers to the public sale of venture ownership in return for 
relatively high levels of financial capital. For example, between the years of 2011 and 
2013 median IPO deal was roughly $114 million USD (WilmerHale, 2014). While the 
impact of such large capital outlays should not be dismissed, it is important to note that 
IPOs represent one of the rarest forms of external funding for entrepreneurial ventures. 
Highlighting this rarity, there were only 178 IPOs in the United States during 2013, a 
figure which was the largest seen since 2007 (WilmerHale, 2014). While the general 
rarity of IPOs may be explained by a number of factors, it may at least in part due to 
issues such as high levels of governmental oversight, the tendency of investment banks to 
target high growth ventures (as with the case of venture capitalists), and the relatively 
high levels of complexity and costs associated with the process.  
Ventures hoping to undertake an IPO must adhere to a lengthy, standardized 
process (for a detailed review of the IPO process, see Certo, 2003; Ellis, Michaely, & 
O’Hara, 1999). The process begins by preparing a formal registration statement, which 
includes a prospectus, with the assistance of an investment bank. Once this is completed, 
the investment banker then arranges for the venture’s management team to market the 
offering to potential investors through a series of roadshows. Importantly, these 
roadshows are attended only by the market’s most influential institutional investors (Edy, 
2000). At the culmination of each roadshow, institutional investors evaluate the venture’s 
prospectus and decide whether or not to invest in the venture by purchasing shares of 
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ownership. Collectively, this description highlights some of the largest differences 
between debt-based funding, public (IPO) equity, and private (VC, angel) equity. Indeed, 
IPOs invlove a highly complex process, which involve a number of different parties aside 
from the entrepreneur and investor, and the way in which entrepreneurs ‘connect’ with 
potential investors is unique to the context. That being said, the ability of entrepreneurs to 
employ various tactics, such as communication, to engender investment remains 
relatively constant across contexts. In the following section I provide an extensive review 
of past research on factors which may influence funding outcomes in traditional contexts 
such as those that I have just discussed.   
How funding is accessed. While the research stream related to entrepreneurial 
finance is quite broad, a large portion of these efforts have been devoted to examining 
characteristics or qualities of entrepreneurs and ventures which may influence resource 
allocation efforts.  In many instances, entrepreneurs may chose to purposefully 
communicate aspects of their ventures (or themselves) to prospective investors in an 
attempt to attract funding. For example, entrepreneurs may attempt to engender 
investment by purposefully highlighting their level of educational attainment (Spence, 
1973) or perhaps even by issuing a press release to highlight a new prestigious alliance 
partner (e.g., Gulati & Higgins, 2003). However, not all factors that may influence 
funding are under the entrepreneur’s control. That being said, while entrepreneurs may or 
may not choose to communicate uncontrollable factors such as gender or location, those 
factors may continue to wield influence over the funding decisions of prospective 
investors due to their visibility. In the following, I provide an overview of extant research 
examining the impact of both controllable and uncontrollable factors on funding 
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outcomes. Collectively, the studies below highlight the ability of entrepreneurs to 
influence funding outcomes through communicating (or potentially withholding) 
information about themselves or their ventures to potential investors.  
To begin, a number of scholars have examined the role played by homophile, 
which refers to the propensity of similar entities to be attracted to one another. Within 
this vein, scholars have explored homophile in a number of dimensions and at numerous 
levels of analysis. For example, at the level of the venture, Huberman (2001) found that 
investors tend to favor ventures that lie within the same geographic location. 
Complementing this research, Coval and Moskowitz (1999) found that U.S. investors 
tend to have a local preference in their domestic equity portfolios. Further, when 
geographic location between investors and a company increases (e.g., perhaps due to a 
move by either party), the likelihood that the investor’s portfolio composition changes 
tends to increase (Bodnaruk, 2009). However, such findings are not only limited to 
typical investment scenarios. Indeed, past research even suggests that geographic 
proximity may even have negative impacts on the interest rates paid by entrepreneurs on 
bank loans (Degryse & Ongena, 2005). Collectively, these studies and others suggest that 
geographic proximity between investors and entrepreneurs may play a relatively 
important role in determining investment outcomes. However, discussing homophile only 
as it relates to geographic proximity provides but only a limited view into a complex 
phenomenon. For example, while I have already established that investment preference 
may be influenced by geographic location, past research suggests that similarity in 
language and culture between entrepreneurs and investors may play a role (Grinblatt & 
Keloharju, 2001). The influence of such similarities may also exist at a much higher 
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level, as evidenced by past research on diaspora networks. For example, Leblang (2010) 
found that diaspora networks, or connections between migrants (living in an investing 
country) and their home country, are positively and significantly related to foreign 
investment. While the current discussion on homophile and investment is by no means 
exhaustive, its purpose is to illustrate the role played by similarities between 
entrepreneurs and resource providers on investment outcomes. That being said, as a 
closing point on the topic, it is also important to note that homophile does not necessarily 
refer to static scenarios, but rather to relatively dynamic states of being. Indeed, past 
research has found that as subjects become increasingly familiar with one another (i.e., 
through subsequent interactions), the likelihood that they will invest larger levels of 
financial capital also increases (Keller & Reeve, 1998).   
In addition to homophile, other scholars have looked to more malleable 
characteristics of entrepreneurs. Of these characteristics, perhaps one of the most widely 
noted and readily visible is that of passion. Entrepreneurial passion refers to “an 
entrepreneur’s [own] intense affective state accompanied by cognitive and behavioral 
manifestations of high personal value” (Chen, Yao, & Kotha, 2009: 201). Increasingly, 
scholars have begun to emphasize the importance of entrepreneurs’ passion in motivating 
their own actions as well as the actions of their stakeholders (Cardon et al., 2013; 
Mitteness, Sudek, & Cardon, 2012). Yet despite this increasing emphasis, the 
examination of how passion influences funding outcomes has been relatively limited. 
Perhaps one of the earliest examples of work within this stream was conducted by Sudek 
(2006), who found that angel investors are more likely to perceive passionate 
entrepreneurs as engaging and interesting. This work was further extended by findings, 
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which suggest that entrepreneurial passion may have a direct influence on the funding 
decisions of potential investors (Cardon, Sudek, & Mitteness, 2009; Chen et al., 2009). 
While work continues in this area (e.g., Cardon et al., 2013; Davis et al., 2015), there 
remain a number of unanswered questions with regards to entrepreneurial passion.  
Yet another intriguing, yet relatively underdeveloped, area of research deals with 
the tactic of impression management. In traditional contexts, the process of obtaining 
financial capital generally involves a number of social interactions, many of which may 
be face-to-face between entrepreneurs and investors. As such, scholars have begun to 
recognize the importance of social skills, and particularly impression management, in 
influencing the way in which potential resource providers perceive both entrepreneurs 
and ventures (Baron & Markman, 2000). In general, impression management (IM) refers 
to any behavior that is undertaken by individuals to purposefully influence the way in 
which they are perceived by others (Bolino, 1999).  Stated differently, IM may simply be 
viewed as ‘the packaging of information in order to lead target audiences to desired 
conclusions’ (Gardner and Avolio, 1998, p. 33).  
Given the extent to which IM represents ‘the packaging of information,’ a number 
of scholars have suggested that it may represent an effective tactic for entrepreneurs 
seeking to overcome perceptions of illegitimacy or favorability in the eyes of investors. 
Indeed, Carter, Gartner, and Reynolds (1996) suggest that entrepreneurs can enhance the 
likelihood of organizational survival by engaging in IM through acting ‘as if’ their 
ventures were fully operational. For example, Starr and MacMillan (1990) describe a 
Cuban American entrepreneur who created the impression that his business was 
legitimate and operational by utilizing borrowed tools, computers, and a delivery van. 
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Similarly, others have suggested the use of IM through entrepreneurial narratives which 
frame the venture in a way that is unique yet familiar (Lounsbury and Glynn, 2001). 
Although each represents a different IM strategy, both are based on the logic that 
individuals make sense of new products or organizations by drawing upon existing 
knowledge within the environment (Pollack, Rutherford, and Nagy, 2012). Drawing upon 
similar logic, others have suggested that entrepreneurs’ funding performance may be 
enhanced by IM through the use of symbolic actions or characteristics. For example, 
when presenting a funding pitch to potential investors, entrepreneurs may engage in 
symbolic IM through the use of visual props, dress, or perhaps even emotional 
expressiveness (Clarke, 2011). Alternatively, outside of the pitch setting, entrepreneurs 
may engage in IM by creating a website, as it may serve to increase venture legitimacy 
and visibility in the eyes of potential investors (Zott & Huy, 2007).   
In a closely related vein, researchers have also examined the influence of 
entrepreneurs’ social competence, or the ability of one to effectively interact with others 
through the use of discrete social skills (Baron & Markman, 2003). While IM is generally 
viewed as a potential component, social competence may also be influenced by tactics 
such as political skill, or ‘the ability to effectively understand others…and to use such 
knowledge to influence others to act in ways that enhance one’s personal and/or 
organizational objectives (Ferris et al., 2005: 127). Given the variety of tactics and skills 
that influence one’s level of social competence, researchers have looked for interaction 
effects. For example, Treadway and colleagues (2007) found that individuals’ use of IM 
via ingratiation may be more effective when they possess a high level of political skill. 
That being said, social competence as a direct influence certainly represents an important 
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area of promise within entrepreneurship. For example, Baron and Markman (2003) found 
entrepreneurs’ social skills, including the use of IM, to be significantly related to venture 
financial performance across a number of different industries. Similarly, at the 
organizational level, others have found leaders’ social skills to have a significant 
influence on group performance. Taken together, despite its relatively scant application to 
the area of entrepreneurial finance, research generally suggests that IM and, more 
generally, social/political skills represent valuable tools for entrepreneurs hoping to 
obtain external funding. 
Finally, perhaps the most developed stream of venture finance research is built 
upon signaling theory. Initially developed in economics (Spence, 1973), signaling has 
become a widely popular lens of exploration within venture finance (For a detailed 
review, see Connelly et al., [2011]). Although quite broad, research within this area can 
generally be classified in terms of signals pertaining to the entrepreneur, signals 
pertaining to the venture, and signals pertaining to external connections. 
Entrepreneurs and their ventures represent tightly intertwined components of the 
funding pitch. As such, signals providing insight into the underlying quality or potential 
of the lead entrepreneur and/or top management team are generally viewed as key areas 
of interest to potential investors. In terms of the individual entrepreneur, past research 
suggest that CEO shareholdings and external directorships are positively related to 
abnormal stock market returns for IPO ventures (Zhang & Wiersema, 2009). Similarly, 
others have examined how founder ownership enhances the extent to which the venture is 
viewed as attractive by venture capitalists (Busenitz, Fiet, & Moesel, 2005). This work 
has also been extended to the IPO context where past research suggests that insider 
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ownership & management quality influences potential investors (Jain, Jayaraman, & 
Kini, 2008). While the importance of individual entrepreneurs should not be underplayed, 
it is quite common for ventures to be led by a team of entrepreneurs. Given this 
distinction, a number of studies have examined entrepreneur-based signals at the level of 
the top management team (TMT). For example, Filatotchev and Bishop (2002) found that 
board diversity is negatively related to underpricing in IPO ventures. Similarly, it has also 
been found that TMT functional heterogeneity & educational heterogeneity are both 
significantly related to IPO value (Zimmerman, 2008). In addition, others have found that 
role legitimacy and diversity of previous employment affiliations amongst TMT members 
may also influence investor decisions (Higgins & Gulati, 2006). Aside from diversity 
related signals, scholars have also examined signals associated with legitimacy and 
prestige. Specifically, past research suggests that board prestige is negatively associated 
with underpricing in IPO ventures, such that it signals organizational legitimacy to 
potential investors (Certo, 2003). Similar studies have found that, through a similar 
process, TMT legitimacy has a negative relationship with underpricing of IPO ventures 
(Cohen & Dean, 2005).  
 Similar to entrepreneur-related signals, a number of studies have also explored the 
influence of venture-related signals on funding outcomes. Given the importance of past 
experience and/or actions in serving as an indicator of future performance, a number of 
studies suggest that experience/action-based signals carry a high level of value. For 
example, the acquisition of private equity placements in a venture’s early stages of 
development may positively influence future investors (Janney & Folta, 2003; 2006). 
However, entrepreneurial ventures often lack an established track record of performance. 
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As such, investors are often forced to evaluate ventures on the basis of signals produced 
by existing actions or characteristics. For example, investors may look to characteristics 
such as board structure (Certo, Daily, & Dalton, 2001), corporate governance 
characteristics (Ndofor & Levitas, 2004), or other firm-level characteristics listed in the 
prospectus (Daily, Certo, & Dalton, 2005) when making their investment decisions. 
Alternatively, investors may be influenced by signals pertaining to the venture’s 
resources or perhaps even venture ownership. For example, a longer lockup period 
(Arthurs, Buseenitz, Hoskisson, & Johnson, 2008), varying levels of retained ownership 
(Bruton, Chahine, & Filatotchev, 2009), or perhaps even the venture’s strategic flexibility 
and resource endowments (Ndofor & Levitas, 2004) may influence investment 
performance.  
 Entrepreneurship does not happen in a vacuum. Rather, the entrepreneurial 
process, at all stages, is influenced by a number of factors stemming from the external 
environment. Recognizing this, a number of scholars have also explored signals 
stemming from relationships that extend beyond the boundaries of the venture. For 
example Gulati & Higgins (2003) found that both endorsement relationships and 
alliances may influence potential investors. Similarly, others have found that mere 
announcement of a new alliance may also positively impact investment performance 
(Park & Mezias, 2005). However, the signaling power of external relationships is not 
only limited to later stage alliances. Rather, even an underwriter’s prestige may positively 
influence potential investors during the IPO process (Higgins & Gulati, 2006). Similarly, 
the association memberships, past investments, or prior divestments of private equity 
operators may influence potential investors (Balboa & Marti, 2007). Taken together, this 
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research suggests that signals produced by relationships extending beyond the boundaries 
of the venture represent important considerations across investment contexts.  
Section 2.2: Crowdfunding  
 In recent years, both practitioners and scholars alike have begun to develop a keen 
interest in the phenomenon of crowdfunding. However, given the relative nascence of the 
crowdfunding industry as a whole (e.g., Kickstarter was founded in 2009), researchers 
have only begun to scratch the surface, in terms of both theoretical and practical 
implications. Further, given that crowdfunding, as a method of delivery, may be used for 
a variety of funding purposes, existing research has focused on both rewards-based and 
prosocial contexts.  
 The research stream surrounding crowdfunding-based capital exchange initially 
began in the context of crowdfunded microlending. In microlending, or the allocation of 
relatively small loans at low interest rates, the focus is generally on the conduit’s ability 
to serve as a tool for poverty alleviation (Ibrahim, 2012). To this end, scholars have 
explored funding outcomes both in terms of entrepreneurs’ actions and lenders’ decision-
making processes (e.g., Meer, 2014). A key component of crowdfunding-based 
microlending is the entrepreneurial narrative. Highlighting the general importance of this 
text, Allison and colleagues found traditional business language, such as that found in 
traditional business plans, to be negatively related to funding performance (Allison, 
Davis, Short, & Webb, 2015). Similarly, taking a signaling theory perspective, Moss, 
Neubaum, and Meyskens (2015) examined the extent to which entrepreneurial narratives 
might signal entrepreneurs’ behavioral intentions and characteristics to potential lenders. 
Not only did these studies shed light on the influence of rhetoric in shaping microlenders’ 
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perceptions of entrepreneurs, they also extended past research suggesting that 
microlenders have relatively diverse motivations (e.g., Allison, McKenny, & Short, 2013; 
Galak, Small, & Stephen, 2011). 
 Similarly, in the context of rewards-based crowdfunding, researchers have also 
begun to examine the phenomenon from a variety of lenses. For example, in exploring 
the ways in which entrepreneurs communicate with prospective funders, past research has 
examined the influence of costly signals (e.g., Davis & Webb, 2012), costless signals 
(Davis & Allison, 2013), product creativity, and entrepreneurial passion (Davis, Webb, 
Hmieleski, & Coombs, 2014). Further, in a recent exploratory study, Mollick (2014) 
examined the influence of factors such as geographic location of the venture, funding 
period duration, and the number of Facebook friends possessed by the entrepreneur on 
funding performance within the Kickstarter platform. Collectively, these studies have 
contributed to the literature by highlighting the ability of factors (drawn from research in 
traditional investment contexts) to impact the ability of entrepreneurs to garner capital 
through crowdfunding. Additionally, these studies, and others, highlight the uniqueness 
of crowdfunding as a distinct phenomenon, and point to the need for future research to 
examine the influence of non-objective factors, such as emotion, on crowdfunding 
performance.  
While rewards-based platforms certainly represent an increasingly viable source 
of financial capital, recent support from congress and the Securities and Exchange 
Commission has enabled entrepreneurs to obtain equity financing through crowdfunding 
(Stemler, 2013). In attempting to uncover entrepreneurs’ motivation to seek funds 
through one conduit over another, Lambert and Schwienbacher (2014) found that 
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entrepreneurs are more likely to engage in rewards-based crowdfunding (i.e., offering 
funders a product) when startup capital requirements are relatively small compared to the 
market size, but more likely to prefer profit-sharing (i.e., equity-based crowdfunding) 
otherwise. As such, crowdfunding is increasingly able to serve a much broader 
population of entrepreneurs. 
Given the unique nature of rewards-based crowdfunding, the underlying 
motivation of resource providers within context represents a key point of interest. For 
example, a recent case study of customer-based crowdfunding initiatives suggests that 
funders may be motivated by: the ability to be actively involved in bringing a venture or 
product to life, financial incentives stemming from early-stage equity, or simply the 
intrinsic motivation of helping another person  (Ordanini et al., 2011). The existence of 
non-financial/non-rewards based motivation in funders is further supported by findings 
which suggest that ventures presented as a non-profit are more likely to achieve their 
funding goals as compared to for-profit ventures (Belleflamme, Lambert, & 
Schwienbacher, 2013). Yet while these studies and others have advanced the field’s 
knowledge of funder decision-making and motivation, they have only begun to scratch 
the surface.  
In order to glean deeper insight into the phenomenon of crowdfunding, additional 
research is needed in the area of funder decision making. The lack of non-financial 
rewards associated with the context, coupled with nuances such as the existence of for-
profit (rather than prosocial) ventures, suggests that funder motivation is distinct- not 
only from traditional investment contexts, but also from prosocial contexts as well. 
Additionally, crowdfunding’s unique environment, which generally emphasizes not only 
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helping others, but also providing funding for entrepreneurs that may otherwise be 
excluded in traditional contexts, creates yet another point of diversion from traditional 
funding models. To adequately address the impact of the context on individual funders, 
and in turn on resource allocation decisions, future research might be fruitfully enriched 
through the use of more psychology-based approaches, such as in the current study.  
Additionally, this research may also be enriched by looking to the context’s environment 
for cues pertaining to how value is assigned to certain qualities or characteristics, as I 
have done in the current study with social exclusion and other forms of social status.   
Section 2.3: Social exclusion 
  Social exclusion refers to situations in which benefits are inequitably distributed 
between individuals or groups (Buvinić et al., 2004). Social exclusion, as a phenomenon, 
may reflect voluntary individual choices, interests or relationships between actors, or 
perhaps even structural issues such as discrimination (Bhalla & Lapeyre, 1997). As such, 
social exclusion may occur on the basis of factors such as race, gender, group affiliation, 
geography, or perhaps even education (e.g., Bhalla & Lapeyre, 1997; Coleman, 2000, 
2004). For example, the introduction of new, innovative agricultural practices may 
displace existing farming competencies, and thus, reinforce the social exclusion of less-
educated sustenance farmers (Hall, Matos, & Langford, 2008). As a second example, the 
presence of gender biases may cause moneylenders to be less likely to provide female 
entrepreneurs with needed capital, as compared to male entrepreneurs (Alsos, Isaksen, & 
Ljunggren, 2006).  
 Social exclusion may occur in a variety of contexts and often results in highly 
visible problems in society (e.g., Hall et al., 2008). As such, much of the existing research 
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in the area has predominantly been development-related in nature. Indeed, the creation of 
a more inclusive society represents an important objective for governments worldwide 
(c.f., Lee & Drever, 2014). To this end, many governments have looked to develop 
policies geared towards enhancing entrepreneurial activity, which is often viewed as a 
key driver of social and economic change (Schumpeter, 1934). For example, in an effort 
to reduce unemployment rates, the Dutch have promoted entrepreneurship for immigrant 
groups since the 1980s (Kloosterman, 2003). However, while such change may lead to 
increased levels of inclusive growth through the empowerment of individual 
entrepreneurs and their communities (e.g., Hall et al., 2012), they may also lead to 
exclusion if the benefits of such change are distributed unequally. Given that such 
exclusionary dynamics may lead to increased social ills such as corruption and crime, it 
has been suggested that a central issue facing countries attempting to develop a globally 
competitive economy is to avoid excluding members of its society (Hall et al., 2008).  
 While the fostering of entrepreneurship certainly represents a key topic in the 
discussion of social exclusion, scholars within the development-related research stream 
have also examined a number of other factors. For example, social exclusion may arise 
when individuals possess inadequate access to needed infrastructure, such as 
transportation or communication (Cass, Shove, & Urry, 2005). Given that a lack of 
virtual-mobility represents a potential source of social exclusion (e.g., Grimalda, 1999; 
Kenyon, Lyons, & Rafferty, 2002), many countries have begun to implement internet 
communication technology-based programs in an attempt to ensure that their citizens to 
not become excluded from the ‘global information economy’ (Selwyn, 2002). However, 
not all laws within a country reduce exclusion. For example, governmental actions such 
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as the criminalization of hiring illegal immigrants in Europe (Jones et al., 2006), or the 
implementation of neoliberal models of capitalist development in Latin America 
(Veltmeyer, 2002) have contributed to social exclusion. Additionally, such exclusionary 
pressures may be heightened by informal institutions that exist within a given society. For 
example, the ‘taste’ of a given social strata may lead to exclusion, such that high-status 
individuals may dislike low-status people or culture and, in turn, reject them (Bryson, 
1996). Similarly, factors such as discrimination (e.g., Bask, 2005; Blackburn & Ram, 
2006) or rising xenophobia (Mora & Davila, 2005) may explain the disproportionate 
number of ethnic minorities and limited English language proficient individuals that 
engage in self-employment activities within the United States.  
The examination of social exclusion has not been limited to development-related 
works. For example, in the area of psychology, scholars have found that socially 
excluded individuals may be more likely to experience negative emotions (Blackhart et 
al., 2009) or to percieve life as less meaningful (Stillman et al., 2009). The impact of 
social exclusion on humans’ psychological and physiological wellbeing is further 
highlighted by findings which suggest that individuals may in fact experience physical 
pain as a result of being excluded (Eisenberger, Lieberman, & Williams, 2003; 
MacDonald & Leary, 2005). Given such findings, both the importance of social inclusion 
and the reason as to why individuals may be motivated to obtain inclusive membership 
becomes quite clear.   
Given the vast psychological impacts of social exclusion, scholars have also 
become increasingly interested in the corresponding actions of socially excluded 
individuals. By definition, social exclusion refers to a situation in which individuals lack 
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membership in a community that would otherwise provide trust, support, or mutuality 
(Twenge et al., 2007). As such, social exclusion has been measured as ‘deprivation’ from 
access, as compared to others (Bossert, D'ambrosio, & Peragine, 2007). Past research in 
psychology suggests that deprivation may result in outcomes such as a decreased 
likelihood that one will engage in prosocial activities (Twenge et al., 2007) or an 
increased likelihood that one will exhibit aggressive behaviors toward non-excluded 
individuals (DeWall et al., 2009).  
In a more distinct vein, scholars have also focused on actions undertaken by 
individuals in pursuit of social inclusion. Research in marketing suggests that as a result 
of being excluded, consumers may consciously choose certain products as a way of 
differentiating themselves from the majority of others (Wan, Xu, & Ding, 2014). 
Alternatively, others have found that socially excluded individuals are more likely to 
sacrifice financial and personal well-being in order to enhance their social well-being 
(e.g., Duclos, Wan, & Jiang, 2013; Mead et al., 2011). For example, one may be more 
willing to try illegal drugs if they believe it will help them obtain in-group membership 
(Mead et al., 2011). Similarly, the interpersonal rejection of social exclusion may 
enhance financial risk-taking by increasing the instrumentality of money as a tool for 
obtaining social benefits (Duclos et al., 2013).    
Finally, scholars have also examined the role played by social capital within the 
phenomenon of social exclusion. Many have suggested that social capital may represent a 
tool for overcoming social exclusion. For example, in examining poverty-based social 
exclusion in Europe, scholars have often viewed social exclusion as being based in a lack 
of social ties to family, friends, the state, or more generally society (Adato, Carter, & 
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May, 2006; Bhalla and Lapeyre, 1997). However, others suggest that factors such as 
collective action, social relationships, and local institutions may structurally reinforce the 
social exclusion of individuals (Cleaver, 2005). For example, in the case of Swedish 
immigrants, past research suggests that the most probable explanation for social 
exclusion appears to be discrimination, even after controlling for various demographic 
and socioeconomic indicators (Bask, 2005). As a second example, in the case of Sri 
Lankan micro credit markets, individuals facing credit constraints often reduce their 
investments in social capital, thus suggesting reverse causality between social capital and 
access to informal credit (Shoji et al., 2012). Similarly, in their study of Indonesian 
households, Wetterberg (2007) found that while certain social ties may represent a 
mechanism for improving the welfare of impoverished families, the distribution of 
various ties varies by socio-economic class. Thus, despite the ability of social capital to 
improve a given family’s welfare, those most in need of improvement (i.e., the most 
impoverished) may have less access to valuable social ties.  
Section 2.4: Psychology of the underdog 
 Mirroring the definition of social exclusion, the concept of an underdog refers to 
individuals or groups that are at a disadvantage, which may be due to some level of 
injustice or power imbalance, and expected to lose (Merriam-Webster, 2014). 
Throughout human history, people have often revered underdog stories such as David & 
Goliath, the fictional ‘Mighty Ducks,’ and the brave Texans at the Alamo. Indeed, such 
stories often appeal to individuals’ need for fairness and provide a glimmer of hope that 
they, too, can succeed when faced with difficult circumstances (Kim et al., 2008; 
McGinnis & Gentry, 2009). However, despite the general importance of such cultural 
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narratives, relatively little research has specifically examined the underlying psychology 
of underdogs (Vandello et al., 2007).   
 Research on the phycology of underdogs, although relatively sparse, generally 
supports two common premises. First, in competitive scenarios, individuals are more 
likely to root for an underdog as opposed to a top dog (Ceci & Kain, 1982; Frazier & 
Snyder, 1991; Kim et al., 2008). Second, even in the absence of prior affiliation, 
individuals are more likely to identify, support, and sympathize with underdogs (Kim et 
al., 2008). Given these two premises, the underdog effect may best be described as the 
tendency of people to support or root for an individual or organization that is perceived to 
be embarking on a difficult task or competition and not expected to succeed due to 
explicit or implicit disadvantage(s) (Kim et al., 2008; Pollack & Bosse, 2014).  
 A number of psychological explanations have been provided for the inclination of 
individuals to support underdogs. In some cases, supporting an underdog may be 
perceived as going against the norm, and, thus, doing so may fulfill individuals’ need for 
uniqueness (Lynn & Snyder, 2002, Tian, Bearden, & Hunter, 2001). Alternatively, others 
may perceive supporting an underdog as the right thing to do, and doing so may fulfill 
their need for equity or fairness (Allison & Messick, 1985; Folger & Kass, 2000). Finally, 
some may lend their support because witnessing the success of an underdog may provide 
them with the hope that they, too, can succeed when faced with difficult circumstances 
(Kim et al., 2008).  
 Despite the general proclivity of individuals to root for and support underdogs, 
recent research suggests that there may be some limits. Specifically, Kim and colleagues 
(2008) found that individuals may become less likely to support underdogs when 
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consequences are high. For example, individuals may be more likely to contract to a well-
known company (as opposed to an underdog startup) when their own community’s water 
supply is suspected to contain cancer-causing chemicals. In terms of entrepreneurship, 
this limitation may provide some explanation as to why underdogs are often excluded by 
investors in traditional contexts. Indeed, traditional investors generally provide 
entrepreneurs with relatively high levels of financial capital in the hope of receiving 
future financial gains. As such, the decision to invest in a given venture may carry 
(potentially) large consequences. Further, the likelihood of negative consequences 
materializing (e.g., loss of an investment) are quite large in some contexts given that 
roughly one-third of all new ventures fail within the first two years (Headd, 2003; Knaup, 
2005). Taken together, while it is quite clear that individuals generally support underdogs 
for a variety of reasons, that tendency may be overridden by concerns of self-preservation 
in some contexts. However, in the case of crowdfunding underdogs may prove to be 
attractive investments with broad appeal; particularly given the existence of relatively 
low investment thresholds (e.g., $1 to $5) which may enable funders to decrease any 
perceived or actual consequence associated with providing funds.   
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CHAPTER III 
 
 
 
THEORY AND HYPOTHESES 
 
Section 1: Identifying Socially Excluded Underdogs 
Social exclusion refers to situations in which benefits are inequitably distributed 
between individuals or groups (Buvinić et al., 2004). Thus, from an economic 
perspective, social exclusion may best be defined as the extent to which individuals are 
excluded from accessing assets such as financial capital (Adato et al., 2006). Given the 
difficulty experienced by socially excluded groups in such situations, they may be 
generally perceived as underdogs. Social exclusion, and in turn underdog status, may 
reflect voluntary individual choices, interests or relationships between actors, or even 
discrimination (Bhalla & Lapeyre, 1997). As such, underdog status may stem from 
factors such as ethnicity, gender, group affiliation, or perhaps even education (e.g., Bhalla 
& Lapeyre, 1997; Coleman, 2000, 2004). While such factors may seem somewhat 
disparate in nature, all share a common characteristic in that each represents an indicator 
of social status.  
Social status may broadly be defined as the degree to which one is accepted by 
others in a particular group (Zeleny, 1940). The level of acceptance that one attains is 
contingent upon the shared status beliefs of a given group and the degree to which those 
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beliefs place value on certain characterizes or qualities (e.g., Ridgeway & Erickson, 
2000). Individuals attain status beliefs through interactions with others in the 
environment. For example, in internet-based communities, community members look to 
publicly available social references when evaluating a focal actor’s reputation, which in 
turn determines that actor’s status within the community (Stewart, 2005). However, one’s 
status beliefs are not static. Instead, one’s status beliefs may be altered or replaced 
through the same process of social interaction (Mark, Smith-Lovin, & Ridgeway, 2009).   
 When assigning social status, individuals may evaluate a variety of indicators 
attached to the focal agent. Perhaps the most widely used measures of social status are 
those related to one’s occupation (Chan & Goldthorpe, 2007; Faunce, 1989; Kalmijn, 
1994) and socioeconomic status (Camfield & Esposito, 2014; Campbell & Henretta, 
1980; Liverpool-Tasie & Winter-Nelso, 2012). From this perspective, individuals that 
possess higher levels of financial worth or hold prestigious occupational positions are 
said to be afforded higher levels of social status. While the importance of occupation and 
socioeconomic wealth in determining one’s social status should not be overlooked, it 
must also be noted that there exists a plethora of other possible status indicators. Indeed, 
individuals that are physically attractive (Webster & Driskell, 1983), possess a high level 
of formal education (Belliveau, O’Reilly, & Wade, 1996), hold a central position in their 
network (Dimov & Milanov, 2010; Pollock et al., 2010), or are part of the ethnic majority 
(Park & Westphal, 2013; Umphress et al., 2007) generally occupy the upper levels of a 
status hierarchy. Additionally, individuals may take actions such as regularly attending 
church (Dillingham, 1965), being generous (Flynn, 2003), or even engaging in violent 
behavior (Papachristos, 2009) to increase their social status.  
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 The general importance of social status lies within the power (or lack thereof) that 
it affords the holder. At the industry level, high-status new entrants are more likely to be 
viewed positively by existing competitors, and, in turn, less likely to be preyed upon 
(Podolny & Morton, 1999). Alternatively, at the organizational level, high status CEO’s 
may hold a higher level of influence over the compensation chair, and, in turn, receive 
higher salaries (Belliveau et al., 1996). Taken together, these two examples highlight the 
power social status may afford. Additionally, they illustrate how social status may be 
applied to both individuals and organizations. This is important when examining the 
influence of social status indicators within the context of entrepreneurial finance, given 
that both individual entrepreneurs and ventures are involved. I discuss these implications 
at greater length in the following sections.  
Section 2: Crowdfunding and Support for Underdogs  
In traditional funding contexts, such as angel investment and venture capital, 
investors generally provide entrepreneurs with relatively high levels of funds. For 
example, between the years of 1995 and 2003, the average venture capital deal in the 
United States was $7 million (NVCA, 2013). Despite the existence of such large capital 
outlays, the investment landscape is dominated by a relatively small number of 
professional investors (e.g., Benjamin & Margulis, 2001; Gamba & Kleiner, 2001) who 
provide capital with the hopes of reaping future financial rewards. As such, traditional 
investment environments are often viewed through a lens of risk and reward. Indeed, the 
existence of large capital outlays typically provided by investors, coupled with their 
desire to achieve profitability through future financial returns, highlights the potential 
consequence associated with acting as an investor.  
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In stark contrast, crowdfunding platforms generally provide entrepreneurs with 
low levels of funds to support a specific purpose (Davis & Webb, 2012). For example, on 
the popular crowdfunding platform Kickstarter, the majority of entrepreneurs receive less 
than $10 thousand (Kickstarter, 2014a). Similar to the aggregate funding levels, the 
average amount of capital provided by each funder is also quite low. Indeed, 
crowdfunding platforms are ‘democratic’ funding conduits, which enable laypersons 
from the general public to act as funders, with each individual providing as little as $1. 
Such an arrangement is made possible due to the absence of equity stakes and financial 
reward. Instead, funders provide entrepreneurs with financial capital in exchange for 
some level of extrinsic reward (e.g., the product being funded), intrinsic gift (e.g., a 
simple ‘thank you’), or sometimes, for nothing at all.  
Despite the growing relevance of crowdfunding, relatively little is known about 
why funders might support some entrepreneurs and ventures but not others. However, the 
unique nature of the funding environment suggests that funders may be motivated, at 
least in part, by the need to serve otherwise excluded groups (i.e., underdogs). Indeed, 
given that funders generally provide low levels of financial capital and rewards are 
known ex-ante, it would seem that the potential consequence of providing capital is quite 
low. As such, past research suggests that the propensity of individual funders to support 
or sympathize with underdog entrepreneurs is likely to translate into action through the 
provision of funds (Kim et al., 2008).  
The likelihood that funders will support and sympathize with underdog 
entrepreneurs is further reinforced by the culture that has developed around 
crowdfunding. Indeed, crowdfunding has been cited as a potential boon for otherwise 
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excluded underdog groups, such as women and minority entrepreneurs (Overly, 2013; 
Thorpe, 2014). Additionally, media outlets have recently noted the increasing role played 
by women in the crowdfunding industry (Thorpe, 2014), the emergence of ethnic-
minority-specific platforms (Overly, 2013), and a backlash against celebrity figures 
attempting to engage in crowdfunding, despite their ability to access capital through 
traditional means (Zara, 2013). The potential impact of crowdfunding’s highly visible 
culture may best explained through past research on social influence, which suggests that 
witnessing the actions of others may have a powerful influence on one’s behavior (For a 
review, see Cialdini & Goldstein, 2004). In other words, the pervasive and widespread 
knowledge of crowdfunding’s culture, coupled with the visible actions of others acting in 
accordance with that culture (i.e., supporting otherwise excluded groups), may increase 
the likelihood that funders will not only sympathize with underdog entrepreneurs, but 
also support them by providing funds.  
The classification of an individual or venture as part of a socially excluded group, 
and thus an underdog, may be a factor of numerous dimensions (Bhalla & Lapeyre, 
1997). Yet, in a virtual environment such as crowdfunding, only a limited set of readily 
visible and/or salient social indicators may be available for identifying potential 
underdogs. For example, although socioeconomic status represents one of the most 
common indicators of status (Camfield & Esposito, 2014), such information is generally 
not available or relevant to potential funders due to rewards-based (i.e., non-equity) 
nature of the context. That being said, a number of widely acknowledged indicators of 
social status, such as entrepreneur gender (Alsos et al., 2006), ethnicity (Park & 
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Westphal, 2013), or education (Belliveau et al., 1996), are likely to be both available and 
highly visible to potential funders.  
In the following, I examine the extent to which entrepreneurs and ventures that 
are often excluded by investors in traditional contexts, and thus represent underdogs, are 
supported within the context of crowdfunding. Drawing on past research on underdog 
psychology (Kim et al., 2008), social exclusion (Bhalla & Lapeyre, 1997), and social 
status (Bitektine, 2011), I test my theory by examining various social status indicators 
associated with entrepreneurs and their ventures, which may influence the extent to 
which they are perceived as underdogs by potential funders. Specifically, I examine: (1) 
entrepreneurs’ ethnicity; (2) entrepreneurs’ gender; (3) entrepreneurs’ level of formal 
education; (4) entrepreneurs’ level of functional experience; (5) venture industry 
affiliation; and (6) use of underdog rhetoric in the entrepreneurial narrative. I begin by 
examining characteristics pertaining to the individual, which include the presence of a 
lead-entrepreneur who is: a female, an ethnic minority, or one that possesses a low-level 
of formal education or past functional experience. I then examine the venture-level 
characteristic: the typical funding requirement associated with ventures in a given 
industry classification. Finally, I explore the role played by narrative text in shaping 
funders’ underdog perceptions.  
Section 3: Underdog status: the entrepreneur 
 
Section 3.1: Minority-led ventures  
  
Minority owned businesses represent a fast-growing segment of the United States 
economy (Young, 2002). Reflecting this growth, minority-owned businesses created 5.9 
million jobs in 2007 alone (Small Business Administration, 2011). While the 
  
  42
classification of a given ethnic group as a minority is contingent upon the country 
context, in the United States one is considered a minority if they are a member of the 
following ethnic groups: American Indian or Alaska Native, Asian or Native Hawaiian or 
Pacific Islander, Black, or Latino (Lowrey, 2007; Shelton, 2010). Minorities are often 
excluded, either directly or indirectly, from high paying positions within the labor 
market, and, as such, are more likely to engage in start-up activities as compared to their 
Caucasian counterparts (e.g., Bogan & Darity, 2008; Edelman et al., 2010). Perhaps due 
to this proclivity, roughly 50% of all small businesses in the United States are now owned 
by minorities or women (Asiedu, Freeman, & Nti-Addae, 2012). Yet despite the growing 
importance of minority-owned ventures, these entrepreneurs often face great difficulty 
when accessing needed financial capital through external sources (Blanchard, Zhao, & 
Yinger, 2008; Edelman et al., 2010; Young, 2002). 
The ability of entrepreneurs to access necessary financial capital represents an 
important area of concern. While a weak financial structure can lead to problems in all 
areas of the venture (Timmons, 1999), the possession of adequate financial stocks may 
enhance venture viability and serve as a buffer against liabilities of newness (Cooper, 
Gimeno-Gascon, & Woo, 1994; Manolvavet al., 2006). When unable to access adequate 
levels of financial capital, entrepreneurial ventures often fail (Coleman, 2000; Neeley & 
Van Auken, 2012), or are skewed towards labor-intensive activities and unrewarding 
sectors of the economy (Edelman et al., 2010; Ram et al., 2003). In order to overcome 
various structural, cultural, and discriminatory barriers, minority entrepreneurs have long 
cooperated with one another by engaging in activities such as sharing financial resources 
(e.g., Bates, 1997b) or forming groups to heighten business visibility and leverage (e.g., 
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Pearson, Fawcett, & Cooper, 1994). However, such efforts generally fail to serve as an 
adequate replacement for traditional investment or lending conduits (e.g., Pessar, 1995).   
Past research examining minority-owned ventures’ access to external sources of 
financial capital generally agree that barriers exist (Asiedu et al., 2012; Cavalluzzo & 
Wolken, 2005). Even when controlling for factors such as personal net worth and credit 
score (Blanchflower, Levine, & Zimmerman, 2003), minority entrepreneurs are more 
likely to be denied debt-financing as compared to their Caucasian counterparts (Asiedu et 
al., 2012). For example, in their study of the small business loan market, Cavalluzzo and 
Woken (2005) found that while Caucasian owned ventures had a 26% probability of 
being turned down by lenders, the same probability for Asians was 44%, 51% for Blacks, 
and 42% for Latinos. Further, when access is obtained, minorities generally receive less 
favorable terms and pay higher interest rates (e.g., Asiedu et al., 2012; Blanchflower et 
al., 2003). 
 Minority entrepreneurs’ inability to easily access external sources of financial 
capital, as compared to their Caucasian counterparts, suggests that they may generally be 
viewed as underdogs. While funders and entrepreneurs generally do not meet face-to-
face, the highly visible nature of an entrepreneur’s ethnicity within the funding pitch 
makes underdog identification possible. This is important, because even in the absence of 
prior affiliation, individuals are more likely to identify and root for underdogs (Kim et al., 
20008). Within crowdfunding, there exists a widespread culture that advocates the 
support of otherwise excluded groups (Overly, 2013; Thorpe, 2014), which, in turn, 
suggests that potential funders will value an entrepreneur’s ethnic minority status (e.g., 
Bitektine, 2011). However, the extent to which funders support ethnic underdogs may not 
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be driven by crowdfunding culture alone. For example, given an increasing cultural 
emphasis on racial equality (Klotz, 1995), supporting minority underdogs may be 
perceived as the ‘right thing’ to do and, thus, providing financial capital may fulfill 
funders’ need for equity or fairness (Allison & Messick, 1985; Foger & Kass, 2000). As a 
second example, given the various difficulties faced by minority underdogs, some may 
lend their support because witnessing the entrepreneurs’ success may provide funders 
with the hope that they, too, can succeed when faced with difficult circumstances (Kim et 
al., 2008). Taken together, this suggests that funders will lend support towards ethnic-
minority entrepreneurs. Additionally, given the relatively low levels of consequence 
associated with providing capital through crowdfunding, the extent of funder support and 
accompanying action may be heightened. Thus, I hypothesize: 
Hypothesis 1: In the crowdfunding context, the existence of a lead-entrepreneur 
who is an ethnic-minority will be positively related to funding performance.  
 
Section 3.2: Women-led ventures 
 
Similar to minorities, women owned ventures also represent an important and 
growing component of the entrepreneurial engine, which drives the U.S. economy 
(Becker-Blease & Sohl, 2007; Neeley & Van Auken, 2010). As of 2002, there were 
roughly 6.2 million women-owned ventures in the United States, which together 
generated $1.5 trillion in sales and employed roughly 9.2 million people (Amatucci & 
Sohl, 2004). Further, between 1997 and 2002, the number of women-owned ventures in 
the United States increased 19.8%, or almost twice the rate of all U.S. businesses 
(Coleman & Robb, 2009). Yet despite this tremendous growth, past research generally 
suggests that women entrepreneurs often receive considerably lower levels of financial 
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capital as compared to men (e.g., Coleman, 2000, 2004; Constantinidis, Cornet, & 
Asandei, 2006). 
The exclusion of women entrepreneurs from traditional sources of financial 
capital has been noted in multiple country contexts and found to persist across ethnicities. 
While Caucasian women often have lower denial rates as compared to ethnic minorities, 
they continue to be significantly higher than those of Caucasian males (Asiedu et al., 
2012). For example, between 1953 and 1998, less than five percent of venture capital 
funding in the United States went to women entrepreneurs (Brush et al., 2001). As a 
second example, in their study of Canadian entrepreneurs, Riding and Swift (1990) found 
that women-led ventures receive less favorable financing terms than do men. Not only 
were women found to be less likely to be approved for loans, but also more likely to 
require a cosigner, to put up collateral, and to be charged higher interest rates. 
There exist a number of potential factors that may contribute to the difficulty 
experienced by women entrepreneurs attempting to garner financial capital through 
traditional means. First, given that investors, such as venture capitalists or angels, are 
often men  (e.g., Brush et al., 2001; Brush et al., 2004), homophile may explain some 
variation. However, past research examining homophile amongst male and female angel 
investors (Becker-Blease & Sohl, 2007) suggests that the phenomenon is much more 
complex. Next, given the existence of various social and cultural norms, gender biases 
may also play a role. Supporting this view, both Fay and Williams (1993) and Buttner 
and Rosen (1988) found that lenders often attribute more characteristics associated with 
successful entrepreneurs to men as compared to women. Such biases may prevent women 
from securing needed certifications or conforming to various industry norms, which 
  
  46
might otherwise make them more attractive to resource providers. For example, given 
that women entrepreneurs often have restricted access to business clients (Bates, 2002) 
and are more likely to experience reliability issues with suppliers (Weiler & Bernasek, 
2001), they may be viewed as risker ‘investments’ as compared to men (Becker-Blease & 
Sohl, 2007). Further, given the difficulty associated with garnering external resources 
(Amatucci & Sohl, 2004), women are more likely to depend on internal sources of equity, 
which, in turn, may hamper their ability to grow and introduce new products or services 
(Chaganti, DeCarolis, & Deeds, 1995).  
Taken together, past research examining the difficulty experienced by women 
entrepreneurs attempting to garner funding suggests that they generally represent 
prototypical underdogs. The extent to which prospective funders are likely to view 
women as underdogs is highlighted by not only extant research but also by popular media 
which often suggests it to be a ‘well-known fact’ that women entrepreneurs face a 
number of barriers (Berenson, 2014), particularly in the context of venture financing 
(Stengel, 2015), and that women entrepreneurs often feel ostracized (Overly, 2013). In 
the crowdfunding context, entrepreneurs’ gender is often highly visible within the 
funding pitch, thus making it possible for funders to easily identify the exclusionary 
underdog status of a given entrepreneur. This is important, as past research suggests that 
individuals often identify and root for underdogs, even in the absence of prior affiliation 
(Kim et al., 2008). In the case of gender-based discrimination, supporting the underdog 
may be perceived as the ‘right thing’ to do and, in turn, fulfill funders’ need for equity or 
fairness (Allison & Messick, 1985; Foger & Kass, 2000). The likelihood for such support 
is strengthened by the contextually embedded value of social status (Bitektine, 2011), as 
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the mission and image of crowdfunding generally suggest that status indicators 
traditionally indicative of underdogs will be valued in the crowdfunding context. Thus, 
given that the relatively low level of consequence associated with providing capital 
through crowdfunding suggests that funders’ psychological support for underdogs will 
translate into action (Kim et al., 2008), I hypothesize the following:  
Hypothesis 2: In the crowdfunding context, the existence of a female lead-
entrepreneur will be positively related to funding performance. 
 
Section 3.3: Entrepreneur education and functional experience 
Education represents one of the most common proxies of human capital (Bates, 
1997a), and the acquisition of an advanced degree (i.e., Master’s degree or above) 
signifies an individual’s attainment of human capital (Almus & Nerlinger, 1999; Becker, 
1962; Colombo, Delmastro, & Grilli, 2004). In the context of entrepreneurship, 
increasing levels of formal education have been linked to venture financial performance 
(Carpenter, 2002; Higgins and Gulati, 2006), and may also serve as a point of distinction 
given the time and monetary costs associated with their attainment (e.g., Spence, 1973). 
For this reason, the educational background of a venture’s management team represents 
an important area of concern for prospective investors in traditional contexts (e.g., 
Kirsch, Goldfarb, & Gera, 2009; Zimmerman, 2008), and may influence the extent to 
which the venture is viewed as legitimate and worthy of investment (Cohen and Dean, 
2005).  
 While some suggest that groups such as women or minorities may often lack 
needed educational credentials (e.g., Hisrich & Brush, 1985), others have found the 
opposite to be true (Birley, Moss, & Saunders, 1987). Further, in recent decades, the 
educational gap which once existed between Caucasian males and women / minorities 
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has increasingly dissipated (e.g., Baker, & Velez, 1996; Gurin et al., 2002). As such, the 
legitimizing power of an advanced degree may function independently from other 
characteristics of the individual in possession. Supporting this view, past research 
suggests that the possession of an advanced degree may even increase the likelihood that 
otherwise excluded groups, such as ethnic minorities, will be able to access financial 
capital through traditional means (e.g., Bates, 1985).  
Similar to education, increasing levels of functional experience also serve as a 
relatively common proxy for human capital and ability (Zimmerman, 2008). By enabling 
entrepreneurs to absorb, process, and interpret information, knowledge can contribute to a 
venture’s ability to successfully navigate complex task environments (Zimmerman, 
2008), enact strategic change (Wiersema and Bantel, 1992), and innovate (Bantel and 
Jackson, 1989). As such, the specialized knowledge embedded within entrepreneurs’ skill 
sets may influence not only the financial performance of the venture (e.g., Higgins and 
Gulati, 2006) but also the way prospective funders perceive the potential of a new 
venture (Cohen and Dean, 2005). 
 Taken together, the previous discussion highlights the level of importance placed 
on both formal education and functional experience in traditional investment contexts. 
Indeed, the level of importance placed on educational attainment and functional 
experience by traditional investors (e.g., Cohen and Dean, 2005; Kirsch et al., 2009) 
suggests that entrepreneurs lacking these qualities may be at a disadvantage and, thus, be 
considered underdogs. Although not required in crowdfunding, it is quite common for 
entrepreneurs to follow the norms of traditional contexts by providing details related to 
their education and past functional experience. However, doing so is likely to have the 
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opposite effect. Specifically, in environments where one or more entities are in 
competition (e.g., for financial resources), individuals typically root for an underdog 
(Ceci & Kain, 1982; Kim et al., 2008). Additionally, the relatively low consequences 
associated with providing capital within the context suggests that funders’ psychological 
support for underdogs will transmit into tangible action (e.g., Kim et al., 2008), by 
providing funding. Thus, given the disadvantaged state typically experienced by 
entrepreneurs who lack high-levels of formal education or functional experience, and the 
propensity of funders to both value (e.g., Bitektine, 2011) and support underdogs (Frazier 
& Snyder, 1991), I hypothesize the following: 
Hypothesis 3a: The lead-entrepreneur’s lack of an advanced level of formal 
educational attainment will be positively related to funding performance within 
the crowdfunding context.  
 
Hypothesis 3b: The lead-entrepreneur’s lack of past functional experience in the 
same or related industry as the current venture will be positively related to 
funding performance within the crowdfunding context  
 
Section 4: Underdog Status: The Venture & the Pitch  
 
Section 4.1: Underdog industry affiliation  
 
Investors in equity-based contexts, such as angel investment and venture capital, 
provide ventures with relatively high-levels of funds. For example, between 1995 and 
2003, the average venture capital deal in the United States was $7 million (NVCA, 2013). 
Given such large capital outlays, these conduits generally cater to ventures that operate 
within industries that require relatively high levels of start-up and follow-on capital, such 
as those based around technology or consumer goods. For example, during 2013 roughly 
41% of all venture capital investment dollars in the United States were concentrated in 
Silicon Valley (PricewatterhouseCoopers, 2014). While such industries represent a 
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sizable number of ventures, there remain a relatively large swath of industries that may 
be excluded traditional funding conduits due to their lower capital needs (c.f., Brush, 
1997). Reflecting the exclusive nature of these conduits, a recent survey by Sage (2013) 
found that more than half of U.S.-based businesses feel the need to look for alternative 
sources of capital. 
Given that the level of funding a venture requires represents a key factor in 
determining the type or source of funding available, it would seem that funding 
requirements represent an indicator of status. In other words, resource providers may be 
more likely to view ventures as appropriate or right (Aldrich & Fiol, 1994) when their 
funding needs align with the typical investment norms of the investment conduit. For 
example, given relatively high startup-costs and a need for organizational support, 
ventures seeking to design, develop, produce, and commercialize new consumer goods 
are likely to be viewed as acceptable by traditional investors (e.g., VCs). Alternatively, 
given potentially low capital requirements and individual nature of the work, the opposite 
is likely to be true for a venture seeking to produce works of art. 
In the crowdfunding context, and specifically on Kickstarter, ventures are 
differentiated by both industry affiliation and requested funding level. This information 
enables funders to easily identify ventures that are likely to be provided access to 
alternative sources of financial capital and those that are not. For example, given that 
traditional investment conduits heavily cater to ventures engaging in activities related to 
technology development and product design (e.g., PricewatterhouseCoopers, 2014), 
funders may perceive other industry classifications as an indicator of underdog status. As 
a second example, ventures with increasingly low requested funding levels might suggest 
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the entrepreneur(s) is at a financial disadvantage (e.g., impoverished to some degree) and, 
thus, indicate underdog status. While being perceived as an underdog is generally 
troublesome in traditional investment contexts (c.f., Kim et al., 2008), it may be 
advantageous in crowdfunding. Indeed, crowdfunding is often billed as an ‘alternative’ 
source of capital (Dapp, 2013). This cultural norm implies that underdog status is 
something to be valued (Bitektine, 2011) and, thus, may increase funder motivation to 
‘root’ for underdogs. Further, funder motivation to support underdog entrepreneurs on the 
basis of industry affiliation may also be derived from factors such as a need for 
uniqueness (e.g., Lynn & Snyder, 2002) or a need for equity (Allison & Messick, 1985; 
Foger & Kass, 2000). Thus, given the visibility of ventures’ industry affiliations and 
requested funding levels, coupled with the natural propensity of individuals to support 
entities that they perceive to be underdogs, I hypothesize:  
Hypothesis 4a: Belonging to an underdog industry that is likely to be excluded by 
traditional investors, will be positively related to funding performance in the 
crowdfunding context.  
 
Section 4.2: Underdog narrative  
 In rewards-based crowdfunding, and particularly with the Kickstarter platform, a 
written entrepreneurial narrative anchors each entrepreneur’s funding pitch. These 
narratives generally describe the entrepreneur(s), the venture, what the funds will be used 
for, and other personal or venture related details (e.g., Martens, Jennings, & Jennings, 
2007). However, the words used to construct each entrepreneurial narrative vary across 
entrepreneurs, and the presence of certain words has been shown to have both social and 
psychological significance (Bligh, Kohles, & Meindl, 2004). Specifically, the fact that 
crowdfunding allows traditionally excluded groups to easily solicit funding (Overly, 
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2013; Thorpe, 2014), suggests some entrepreneurial narratives may use words depicting 
entrepreneurs and/or ventures as excluded underdogs. A narrative constructed in this 
manner suggests the presence of an underdog by drawing attention to exclusionary 
pressures and/or disadvantages experienced by the entity in question. Indeed, an 
underdog by definition is an entity that is at a disadvantage, which may be due to some 
level of injustice or power imbalance, and expected to lose (Merriam-Webster, 2014). 
In examining the role of entrepreneurial narratives in funding environments, a 
number of recent studies suggest that narratives enable resource providers to form beliefs 
about entrepreneurs and, in turn, influence their investment decisions (e.g., Allison et al., 
2015; Allison et al., 2013; Herzenstein, Sonenshein, & Dholakia, 2011). Similarly, in the 
context of marketing past research suggests that the use of underdog narratives in the 
construction or organizational biographies may increase consumers’ purchase intentions 
and brand loyalty (Paharia et al., 2011). Indeed, individuals are more likely to support 
and sympathize with an entity that is believed to be an underdog (Kim et al., 2008; Ceci 
& Kain, 1982). As such, the ability of entrepreneurial narratives to influence funder 
beliefs raises the question of: can it be assumed that funders with react positively to 
entrepreneurial narratives which use words depicting entrepreneurs and/or ventures as 
underdogs? 
In general, this hypothesis is supported by research in fields such as political 
science, communication, and marketing. For example, in their experiment, Ceci and Kain 
(1982) found that after reading a short narrative describing two presidential candidates, 
participants were more likely to favor the candidate who was framed as an underdog. 
Similarly, Vandello and colleagues (2007) found that, after being primed with a short 
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narrative describing two basketball teams, participants were more likely to support the 
team depicted as an underdog (e.g., fewer past wins, lower payroll, lower odds for a win). 
While these two studies examined the underdog effect within a laboratory setting, data on 
brand perception within the United States generally mirrors these results. Indeed, a recent 
poll by Gallup (2011) suggests that consumers are becoming increasingly wary of large 
corporations and brands. This finding may provide explanation as to why organizations 
employing an underdog narrative are viewed so favorably by consumers; particularly 
given that the influence of underdog narratives on shaping outsider beliefs and actions 
may be heightened in cultures where underdog narratives are part of the national identity 
(Paharia et al., 2011). 
Taken together, these studies suggest that underdog-relevant words within an 
entrepreneurial narrative may increase the likelihood that funders will sympathize with 
and support the entrepreneur in question. While some appeals may be constructed in a 
way that indirectly frames the venture or entrepreneur as an underdog (e.g., simply using 
words which invoke a feeling of disadvantage: weakness, independent, discriminated, 
etc.), others may take a more direct approach. For example, the founders behind Hardcore 
Indie highlighted their underdog status by stating, “we are offering a unique insight into 
two filmmakers lives as they try to kickstart the birth of an independent studio.” 
Alternatively, Guy Richards took a more direct approach to highlighting his underdog 
status by describing his experience with Kioky as “a David and Goliath story.” As can be 
seen, despite taking a different approach to narrative construction, each narrative 
effectively conveys the entrepreneur’s status as an underdog. Further, given the 
prominent role assigned to underdog narratives within the national identity, the influence 
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of such narratives may be heightened in U.S.-based funding environments, such as 
Kickstarter (e.g., Paharia et al., 2011). Indeed, the culture of the United States has long 
revered underdogs, as illustrated through stories such as David and Goliath, the brave 
Texans at the Alamo, or newly arrived immigrants seeking the “American dream.” Thus, 
I hypothesize:  
Hypothesis 5: The use of underdog language in the entrepreneurial narrative will 
be positively related to funding performance 
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CHAPTER IV 
 
 
 
METHODOLOGY 
 
 
 
Section 1: Sample and Data Collection  
 
The current study focused on U.S.-based ventures that completed their funding 
efforts between 2009 and 2012 on the crowdfunding platform Kickstarter.com. 
Kickstarter has been noted as the world’s largest rewards-based crowdfunding platform, 
both in terms of entrepreneur utilization and capital outlays (Zou, 2014). Crowdfunding 
represents a growing and increasingly viable alternative source of capital for early-stage 
entrepreneurs. According to the World Bank, the crowdfunding industry is projected to 
reach between $90 billion and $95 billion by 2025, or almost twice the size of the global 
venture capital industry (Noyes, 2014). Reflecting this potential, a recent survey found 
that while the majority of U.S. businesses have a positive perception of crowdfunding, 
only 4% have used it (Sage, 2013). Since its inception in early 2009, Kickstarter alone 
has provided entrepreneurs with over $1 billion and reported a success rate of 43.34% 
(Kickstarter, 2014a), which closely mirrors that of the open market (e.g., Spinelli and 
Adams, 2012). 
Data from Kickstarter has been used in prior crowdfunding research in 
entrepreneurship (e.g., Davis & Webb, 2012; Mollick, 2014; Belleflamme, Lambert, 
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 & Schwienbacher, 2014). Importantly, Kickstarter maintains the pages associated with 
each funding attempt since the platform’s inception. An initial random sample of 310 
ventures was collected from the Kickstarter platform. However, given the important role 
played by digital video (Mollick, 2014) and the need to maintain consistency within the 
sample frame, 10 ventures were dropped due to the absence of a digital video within their 
pitch. The study’s sample consists of 300 ventures that were based throughout the United 
Stated. The industries represented in the sample included: art, comics, crafts, dance, 
design, fashion, film, food, games, journalism, music, photography, publishing, 
technology, and theater. The ventures sought funding for an average amount of U.S. $10, 
380.74, with a standard deviation of U.S. $14, 434.96. Alternatively, the amount of 
funding actually received by the ventures, on average, accounted for 91% of their stated 
funding goals, with a standard deviation of 113.55. Further, in terms of venture and 
entrepreneur characteristics: 237 (79.0%) ventures classified (by the researcher) as 
‘underdog industries,’ 79 (26.3%) of the ventures were led by female entrepreneurs, 67 
(22.3%) were led by ethnic minorities, 52 (17.3%) were led by entrepreneurs with no 
stated past functional experience, and 278 (92.7%) ventures were led by entrepreneurs 
with a stated formal educational attainment level of a bachelor’s degree or lower.   
Section 2: Measures 
 
Data for the independent, dependent, and control variables were obtained directly 
from the Kickstarter platform. Following previous work (e.g., Deeds et al., 1997; 
Zimmerman, 2008), data for the study were coded, by the author, directly from the 
venture funding pages within the crowdfunding platform. In general, crowdfunding 
platforms enable entrepreneurs to communicate with prospective funders through both 
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digital video and written text (e.g., Mollick, 2014; Davis & Webb, 2012). Due to the 
general autonomy provided to entrepreneurs in determining the content of the funding 
pitch, information communicated through digital video may differ from content found in 
the written text, and vice versa. As such, data was coded from both sources in each 
funding page when applicable or possible. A detailed description of each measure 
follows. 
Section 2.1: Independent variables  
According to the U.S. Census bureau and the Small Business Association, ethnic 
minorities consist of individuals belonging to one of the following groups: Latino, Black, 
American Indian or Alaska Native, Asian or Native Hawaiian or Pacific Islander 
(Lowrey, 2007; Shelton, 2010). Following Blanchard and colleagues (2008), I first 
classified the lead-entrepreneur into four mutually exclusive groups: Asian/Native – 
American /Pacific Islander, Black, Hispanic, and Caucasian. Afterwards, I 
operationalized lead-entrepreneur underdog ethnicity (H1) through the use of four 
dummy variables coded for: Asian, African American, Caucasian, and Hispanic. 
Caucasian was used as the contrast variable in the analysis. Next, to operationalize lead-
entrepreneur underdog gender (H2), I employed a dichotomous variable, which was 
coded 1 when the lead entrepreneur was a woman, and 0 otherwise.  
The acquisition of an advanced degree (i.e., Master’s degree or above) signifies 
an individual’s attainment of human capital (Colombo et al., 2004; Becker, 1962). As 
such, I operationalized underdog lead-entrepreneur underdog education (H3a) as a 
dichotomous variable, which was coded as a 0 when the lead entrepreneur stated that he 
or she possessed a masters degree or higher, and 1 otherwise. Similar to education, the 
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acquisition of functional experience also signifies an individual’s attainment of human 
capital (e.g., Cohen and Dean, 2005). I operationalized lead-entrepreneur underdog 
functional experience (H3b) as a dichotomous variable, which was coded as a 0 when the 
lead entrepreneur stated that he or she possessed functional experienced in the same (or 
related) industry as the current venture, and 1 otherwise.  
 Investors in equity-based contexts, such as angel investment and venture capital, 
provide ventures with relatively high-levels of funds.  The average venture capital deal in 
the United States was $7 million between 1995 and 2013 (NVCA, 2013). As such, these 
conduits generally cater to ventures that operate within industries that require high levels 
of start-up and follow on funds, such as technology. For example, during 2013 roughly 
41% of all venture capital investment dollars in the United States were concentrated in 
Silicon Valley (PricewatterhouseCoopers, 2014). While capital-intensive industries such 
as technology, product design, consumer goods, and manufacturing represent sizable 
industries, there remains a large swath of industries, which may be excluded from 
accessing equity-based conduits due to their lower capital needs. Reflecting these 
excluded groups, a recent survey by Sage (2013) found that more than half of U.S.-based 
businesses feel the need to look for alternative sources of capital. Thus, to operationalize 
underdog industry affiliation (H4), I employed a dichotomous variable that was coded 0 
for ventures classified as operating within the technology industry and product design 
industry (i.e., non-underdog industries), and 1 for all others (e.g., art, music, publishing, 
etc.).  
To capture entrepreneurs’ use of narratives to influence the extent to which they 
are perceived as ‘underdogs’ by funders, I operationalized one content analysis variable-
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underdog-language (H5). Specifically, I created a custom dictionary by drawing upon 
both extant literature examining underdog psychology and validated dictionaries 
developed by DICTION (Hart, 2000). Underdog-language includes terms referring to 
realized or potential disadvantage such as: discriminated, overwhelmed, injustice, 
impoverished, discourage, hardship, uphill, small, setbacks, and failure (See Table 1 for a 
complete listing of terms). Using computer aided text analysis (CATA), dictionaries can 
be run against a set of narratives to assess the presence of the focal constructs (Short & 
Palmer, 2008). In the current study, I examined the entrepreneurial narratives included 
within each crowdfunding request (e.g., Martens et al., 2007), which typically describe 
the venture, the entrepreneurs’ plans, and the entrepreneurs’ expectations. To compare 
the dictionaries against the narratives, I followed the approach of Allison and colleagues 
(2015) by using the DICTION 7 computer-aided textual analysis program. Afterwards, to 
ensure that each word measured by DICTION was used in a way that carried the intended 
meaning, I manually checked each narrative for accuracy. The result of the computer-
aided text analysis is a continuous measurement based on the number of times underdog 
words from the dictionaries occur within the text (i.e., word count). Below are several 
examples of crowdfunding entrepreneurial narratives, which contain underdog-language. 
All three appeals highlight the underdog status of the entrepreneurs and/or their ventures: 
Theatre is Easy: “Unfortunately, the world of websites is a poor, underfunded 
world. Unless you are a non-profit (we’re not) or affiliated with a larger 
organization (we’re not), it’s hard to be financially stable” 
PreasurePen: “Large imprints are unwilling to take a risk on me as an unknown 
author”  
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By This Time Next Year: “Yes, I have terrible timing. Kickstarter was going to be 
my first stop once I had a working prototype, but I was put in contact with a 
potential investor and manufacturer last year who ultimately backed out. This set 
me back by about six months, and in that time the jaja project had stolen my 
thunder as ‘first’ pressure-sensitive iPad stylus” 
Section 2.2: Control variables  
Given a lack of research within the crowdfunding context, and a general diversity 
within the population of both the entrepreneurs seeking financial capital and the 
prospective funders, I drew upon past research in both crowdfunding (e.g., Mollick, 
2014) and traditional investment contexts (e.g., Huberman, 2001)1. Accordingly, I 
controlled for: (1) geographic location; (2) year of funding; (3) top management team 
size; and (4) funder commentary. First, although crowd funding takes place through the 
internet, the physical location of the entrepreneur(s) is made available to prospective 
funders. Thus, in order to protect against geographical bias, I controlled for geographic 
location (e.g., Huberman, 2001). Given that the ventures in the sample were widely 
dispersed throughout the United States, I chose to employ coding based on the U.S. 
Census Bureau’s nine census regions: New England, Mid Atlantic, East North Central, 
West North Central, South Atlantic, East South Central, West South Central, Mountain, 
and Pacific (US Census Bureau, 2015). Dummy variables were used for coding this 
measure. Region 9 (i.e., Pacific) was used as the contrast variable.  
Kickstarter has experienced increasingly large levels of annual growth, both in 
terms of entrepreneur usage and capital outlays (Kickstarter, 2014a). Given that my 
                                                 
1 Prior to reporting the final model, the following impotent control variables were dropped from the 
analysis: video length, narrative word count, funding levels, updates, and reward-structure.  
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sample covers multiple years, I controlled for year of funding through the use of four 
dummy variables (i.e., 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012). The year 2012 was used as the contrast 
variable. Third, larger top management teams (TMT) represent an important resource for 
ventures, in that they are likely to possess higher levels of knowledge and creativity (e.g., 
Walters, Kroll, and Wright, 2010). As such, ventures led by a team, as opposed to an 
individual, may be viewed as more capable or attractive by potential resource providers. 
Thus, I controlled for TMT size through the use of a scaled variable, which was a numeric 
count of the number of team members present. Finally, past research suggests that 
individuals not directly involved in a venture may also shape the way others perceive the 
venture (e.g., Westphal et al., 2012). As such, the feedback left by funders on an 
entrepreneur’s page may influence the way that others perceive the venture. To control 
for the influence of funder commentary, I employed a scaled variable in my analysis, 
which was a numeric count of the number of comments left on each page. Similarly, the 
extent to which an entrepreneur provides regular updates to their funding page may shape 
the extent to which they are perceived as dedicated by prospective funders (e.g., Mollick, 
2014).  
Section 2.3: Dependent variable 
Past research on entrepreneurial finance has often examined funding outcomes in 
relation to the venture’s initial funding goals or needs (e.g., Filatotchev & Bishop, 2002; 
Daily, Certo, Dalton, & Roengpitya, 2003). Importantly, this approach provides an 
indication as to whether or not the venture and/or the management team was viewed as 
legitimate, and thus worth of investment, by prospective investors (e.g., Certo, 2003; 
Cohen & Dean, 2005). Further, weak financial structure may lead to problems throughout 
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a venture (Timmons, 1999), but the possession of adequate levels of financial capital may 
enhance venture performance and buffer against liabilities of newness (Cooper et al., 
1994; Manolva et al., 2006). As such, when venture fail to obtain adequate levels of 
financial capital, the likelihood of failure increases (Coleman, 2000; Neeley & Van 
Auken, 2012).  
In the crowdfunding context, the importance of reaching the venture’s requested 
level of funding is often heightened. Kickstarter operates on an ‘all or nothing’ model, 
which means that ventures only receive capital pledged by funders when the funding goal 
is met or exceeded. For example, two ventures might receive pledges from funders of 
$2,000 and $1,000 respectively. However, if the first venture’s goal was $5,000, and the 
second’s was $1,000, only the latter will receive any money. Due to this, the use of 
‘funding amount received’ as the dependent variable, while controlling for ‘funding goal 
requested,’ suppresses significant variance about investor preference. Therefore, in 
crowdfunding we must view the pledged amount of funds in reference to the amount of 
funds requested. I accomplish this in my analysis through a ratio variable used as the DV. 
Specifically, I operationalized funding performance as: (DV) = Af / Rf. (DV). Where Rf 
represents the amount requested by the entrepreneur and Af equals the amount received at 
the culmination of funding efforts. 
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CHAPTER V 
 
 
FINDINGS 
 
Section 1: Analysis and Result 
To analyze the hypothesized relationships, I used the statistical program SPSS to 
perform multiple linear regression. Prior to running the analysis, I checked for 
multicollinearity. The results showed that the highest condition index was 13.581, which 
is, as recommended, well below the value of 30 (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2001). 
Furthermore, the largest variance inflation factor was 1.434, which is below the value of 
10 that is generally viewed as problematic (Neter, Kutner, Nachtsheim, & Wasserman, 
1996). As such, multicollinearity does not represent a major threat to the overall integrity 
of the study’s results. 
Table 2 presents descriptive statistics for the independent and dependent 
variables. Table 3 presents the results of my regression models. Model 1 includes only 
the control variables, Model 2 the entrepreneur-based social status indicators, Model 3 
the venture-based social status indicators, and Model 4 includes all predictors. The 
increase in variance explained by each model is statistically significant, and the F change 
associated with each model is provided at the bottom of the table. 
 
  
  64
‘Insert Tables 2 and 3 here’ 
Hypothesis 1 predicted that the existence of a lead-entrepreneur who is an ethnic-
minority would be positively related to funding performance. As can be seen in Table 3 
(Model 4), the effect of ethnicity on funding performance is both positive and statistically 
significant for entrepreneurs of Asian descent (b= 0.102; p < .05). However, neither  
African American (b= -0.070) or Hispanic (b= -0.017) was found to have a statistically 
significant effect on funding performance. Thus, only partial support was found for 
Hypothesis 1. Next, Hypothesis 2 predicted that, for crowdfunding ventures, the presence 
of a female lead-entrepreneur would be positively related to funding performance. As can 
be seen in Table 3 (Model 4), underdog gender (i.e., female) is both positive and 
statistically significant (b= 0.112; p < .05), thus providing full support for Hypothesis 2.  
 Hypothesis 3a predicted that the presence of a lead-entrepreneur who lacks an 
advanced college degree would be positively related to funding performance. However, 
as can be seen in Table 3 (Model 4), no support was found for this hypothesis (b= -
0.021). Similarly, I also failed to find support for Hypothesis 3b (Model 4; b= -0.058), 
which predicted that the presence of a lead-entrepreneur who lacks past functional 
experience would be positively related to funding performance.  
 At the venture-level, Hypothesis 4 predicted that belonging to an underdog 
industry (i.e., an industry other than technology or product design) would be positively 
related to funding performance. As can be seen in Table 3 (Model 4), underdog industry 
is both positive and significantly related to funding performance (b= 0.126; p < .05), thus 
providing full support for Hypothesis 4. Finally, Hypothesis 5 predicted that the use of 
underdog language in entrepreneurial narratives would be positively related to funding 
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performance. In line with this prediction, the coefficient for underdog language was 
found to be both positive and significant (b= 0.080; p < .10), thus supporting Hypothesis 
5.  
Section 2: Post-Hoc Analyses   
There exists a substantial stream of literature examining the influence of gender in 
entrepreneurship (e.g., Asiedu et al., 2012; Brush et al., 2001, 2004). Similarly, popular 
media has become increasingly interested in the ability of crowdfunding to essentially 
‘close the gender gap’ between women and men entrepreneurs in the context of venture 
funding (e.g., Berenson, 2014; Overly, 2013). The results of the current study suggest 
that, in crowdfunding, women-led ventures may outperform those led by men. However, 
the funding success of women-led ventures may be influenced by factors beyond gender. 
For example, a female entrepreneur who lacks (possess) a master’s degree might be 
perceived as more (less) of an underdog by potential funders. To explore this possibility, 
I examined a series of interactions with lead-entrepreneur gender (female): underdog 
education, underdog experience, underdog ethnicity, underdog industry, and underdog 
language. All variables were mean-centered prior to the analysis. The results of the 
analysis produced only one (albeit interesting) statistically significant relationship. 
Specifically, I found the interaction effect of gender (female) and ethnicity (African 
American) to have both a negative and significant (b= -1.908; p= 0.057) relationship with 
funding performance. While this finding may suggest the existence of racial bias within 
crowdfunding, it may also simply be due to small sample size. 
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Next, given that Kickstarter launched in the first year of the study’s sample (i.e., 
2009), it is possible that the decision norms of prospective funders may have changed in 
subsequent years (Axelrod 1986; Bettenhausen & Murnighan, 1985). To examine this 
possibility, I ran a regression on a subset of the data consisting only of ventures which 
sought funding during 2012. The results of this analysis were quite different from those 
obtained using the multi-year data set. Specifically, I found only underdog-language (b= 
0.161; p= 0.037) and entrepreneur (female) gender (b= 0.171; p= 0.037) to be 
significantly related to funding performance. That being said, the lack of statistical 
significance in this single-year model may be explain by the small sample size, which 
consisted of only 125 ventures.  
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CHAPTER VI 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Section 1: Discussion of Findings 
Crowdfunding platforms represent relatively new and important internet-based 
conduits through which entrepreneurs can access start-up funds. According to the World 
Bank, the crowdfunding industry is projected to reach between $90 billion and $95 
billion by 2025, or almost twice the size of the global venture capital industry 
(Massolution, 2013; Noyes, 2014). Herein, I attempted to gain an understanding of how 
entrepreneurs’ social status- in terms of identifying one as an underdog- shapes funder 
behavior on crowdfunding platforms. The extent to which underdog status is viewed 
negatively by traditional investors is highlighted by a plethora of research (c.f., Connelly 
et al., 2011; Coleman, 2000; Blanchflower et al., 2003). However, the potential for 
investment environments, such as crowdfunding, in which resource providers view 
underdog status positively, represents an important, yet under-studied phenomenon.  
My findings represent a more comprehensive understanding of how social status 
may influence the ability of entrepreneurs to garner funding. Guided by past research on 
underdog psychology (Vandello et al., 2007), social exclusion (Buvinić et al., 2004) and 
social status (Bitektine, 2011) I find that entrepreneurs in crowdfunding benefit from 
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some forms of underdog status. While research has pointed to the propensity of 
individuals to support underdogs in competitive scenarios (Ceci & Kain, 1982; Frazier & 
Snyder, 1991), we know less about individuals’ support for underdogs in transaction-
based environments, such as crowdfunding (e.g. Vandello et al., 2007). By drawing on 
underdog psychology and suggesting that acting as a funder generally represents an 
activity of low consequence (Kim et al., 2008), I develop a model of funder decision-
making which suggests funders are more likely to provide capital to entrepreneurs that 
possess qualities typically indicative of underdog status. My findings indicate that in 
crowdfunding, entrepreneurs who possess underdog status indicators, which may be 
perceived negatively by traditional investors, are more likely to attain and surpass their 
funding goals.  
While underdog psychology has been studied in areas such as marketing, 
psychology, and political science (Fleitas, 1971; McGinnis & Gentry, 2009; Paharia et 
al., 2011; Simon, 1954) it has yet to gain any traction amongst entrepreneurship scholars. 
Further, extant research on social status has generally focused on how certain status 
indicators, such as possessing a low level of formal education or perhaps even being a 
woman, may cause entrepreneurs to be excluded from accessing financial capital 
(Constantinidis et al., 2006; Cohen and Dean, 2005). This study takes a different 
approach by examining the role of underdog status in terms facilitating resource 
exchange between entrepreneurs and prospective funders through the process of 
underdog psychology. In particular, enhancing funding performance via the 
communication of underdog status is a novel idea that has rarely, if ever, been visited in 
past entrepreneurial research. However, it offers the potential for important insights, 
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particularly given that underdog entrepreneurs (e.g., socially excluded groups) are often 
excluded from accessing financial capital through more traditional outlets.  
Social indicators that signal an entrepreneur’s underdog status to potential funders 
enable entrepreneurs to more effectively obtain their funding goals. In traditional funding 
contexts, a breadth of research highlights the difficulty often faced by female 
entrepreneurs when attempting to garner financial capital (Brush, 1997; Brush et al., 
2001; Riding and Swift, 1990). However, the results seem to suggest the opposite to be 
true in the context of crowdfunding. In line with my expectations, I find that the presence 
of a lead female entrepreneur has both a positive and significant effect on funding 
performance. At the same time, this suggests that a venture led by an all-male team may 
be at a disadvantage. Thus, from a theoretical standpoint, this finding not only suggests 
the existence of an underdog effect, but also highlights the importance of the context in 
determining the value of a given status indicator (e.g., Bitektine, 2011).   
At the venture and pitch levels of analysis, I found more consistent results. Data 
examining equity investment within the United States suggests that traditional investors 
tend to favor industries related to technology and product design (Pricewatterhouse-
Coopers, 2014). Further, a number of industries may be excluded from traditional 
conduits given that they require comparatively lower levels of capital (c.f., Brush, 1997). 
Given such industry level distinctions, I expected that industry classification would 
represent an important indicator of status. In line with this logic, the findings suggest that 
belonging to an industry other than technology or product design (i.e., an underdog 
industry) has both a significant and positive effect on funding performance. Similarly, at 
the level of the pitch I found support for the benefit of underdog language within the 
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entrepreneurial narrative. While past research generally supports the ability of underdog 
narratives to engender external support (Paharia et al., 2011), it has yet to be applied in a 
funding environment. While extant research examining the influence of narratives in 
investment contexts generally suggests that negative tone (which seems prototypical of 
underdog rhetoric) instills negative feelings in prospective investors (e.g., Dillard and 
Peck, 2000; Nan, 2008) and, in turn, decreases the likelihood that they will cooperate 
through providing capital (Hecht and LaFrance, 1995). That being said, the positive 
association between underdog language and funding performance found in the current 
study seems to support the role of potential consequence in determining underdog 
support. Indeed, as suggested previously, investors in traditional contexts often face much 
higher potential consequences (e.g., in terms of potential financial loss) as compared to 
funders.  
Finally, a particularly interesting finding from this study is that social status 
indicators in the form of experience and educational attainment did not play the relatively 
prominent role suggested by existing research (Blanchflower et al., 2003; Higgins and 
Gulati, 2006). Indeed, neither of the two status indicators were found to have a significant 
effect on funding performance. Similarly, the heavily examined status indicator of 
ethnicity (Asiedu et al., 2012; Cavalluzzo & Wolken, 2005) was only found to be 
significant for entrepreneurs of Asian descent. One interpretation of these findings may 
be related to the timing of the sample. My sample frame began in 2009, which also 
represents the first year of operation for the Kickstarter platform (Kickstarter, 2014b). As 
of 2015, the support of underdog entrepreneurs appears to be a dominant norm within 
crowdfunding currently (e.g., Overly, 2013; Thorpe, 2014). However, the development of 
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norms, and in turn the value assigned to a given status (Bitektine, 2011), occur over time 
rather than instantaneously (Axelrod 1986; Bettenhausen & Murnighan, 1985). Because 
of this, funders in my sample may not have placed the same level of value on certain 
indicators of underdog status as compared to funders in the current day. Alternatively, it 
may also be possible that funders identify (and support) underdogs on the basis of more 
individualized indicators, as opposed to relatively broad characteristics such as 
experience or education. Taken together, my findings highlight the nuanced value of 
social indicators and their impact on the ability of nascent entrepreneurs to garner 
funding.   
My findings suggest that indicators of underdog social status, particularly in the 
forms of gender, ethnicity, industry affiliation, and narrative text may alter resource 
allocation outcomes within crowdfunding. My focus on underdog psychology 
complements extant research that highlights entrepreneurs’ social status as facilitating 
their relationships with individuals outside of the venture. For example, Asiedu and 
colleagues (2012) examined the role played by gender in loan denial rates and found that 
women entrepreneurs were significantly more likely to be denied access to financial 
capital as compared to their male counterparts. I extend this research by showing how 
entrepreneurs can actually draw upon their underdog status, such as being a woman, to 
attract funding more effectively. Moreover, the existence of underdog status seems to 
enable entrepreneurs to attract funding more effectively than the existence of ‘top dog’ 
status alone (e.g., past functional experience). An opportunity for future research may be 
to examine possible interaction effects between indicators of ‘underdog’ and ‘top dog’ 
social status. For example, potential funders may become increasingly likely to support 
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underdog entrepreneurs with low-levels of formal education if they possess an extensive 
track record of success.  
Section 2: Limitations 
At this point, I would like to point out a few limitations of my study. First, due to 
privacy concerns, Kickstarter does not share data with researchers, thus making it 
difficult to construct a methodologically sound sample. To overcome this issue, I instead 
drew upon a public database, which provides the web address for all of the funding pages 
that were active on Kickstarter between 2009 and 2013. While this strategy enabled me to 
construct a random sample, it also created a unique limitation. Kickstarter launched in 
April of 2009 (Kickstarter, 2014b), which is also the first year of my sample frame. Past 
research on the emergence of decision norms within groups suggests that when 
uncertainty exists with regards to appropriate behavior, individuals often look to existing 
social scripts to guide their behavior in the current situation (Bettenhausen & Murnighan, 
1985). As such, in the early years of rewards-based crowdfunding, prospective funders 
may have drawn upon the norms of traditional investment activity. However, in recent 
years, rewards-based crowdfunding has grown significantly both in terms of usage and 
prominence. For example, the increased cultural pervasiveness of Kickstarter may be 
highlighted by a news search using Google, which as of January 2015 returned over four 
million hits. This is important, because as new groups begin to solidify and their 
members continue to interact, new decision norms emerge and existing norms are often 
revised (Axelrod 1986; Bettenhausen & Murnighan, 1985). As such, while popular 
media’s cultural narrative of underdog support in crowdfunding (e.g., Overly, 2013; 
Thorpe, 2014) may be reflective of funders’ current decision norms, the same may not 
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have been as strongly established for the funders in my study’s sample frame, which ran 
from 2009 to 2012.  
A second limitation of the current study is due to the type of content analysis I 
employed. Computer-aided textual analysis (CATA) employs a summation of the number 
of times construct words appear in a given narrative. This means that computer-aided 
textual analysis can be susceptible to words used out of context. In addition, some facility 
in understanding the rich meaning of narratives is given up so that many narratives can be 
evaluated with perfect reliability (Duriau, Reger, and Pfarrer, 2007). However, these 
limitations enable researchers to assess the tone of narratives without being distracted by 
the information content of the message (e.g., Hart, 2000). Next, a related limitation deals 
with the content that was analyzed using CATA. In rewards-based crowdfunding, and 
Kickstarter in particular, entrepreneurs generally convey information to prospective 
funders through both digital video and written text (Davis & Webb, 2012). However, in 
the current study, only the written narratives from each pitch were analyzed for the 
examination of underdog language. This limitation potentially limits my findings, in that 
the information communicated through the two conduits (i.e., text and video) is not 
necessarily the same. For example, an entrepreneur may choose to focus on the product in 
the narrative, but focus on his or her person experience (e.g., underdog narrative) in the 
video. Thus, while existing research provides a basis for only examining the written 
portion of entrepreneurial narratives (e.g., Allison et al., 2015), doing so in the context of 
crowdfunding may limit potential findings of both the current study and future research.  
Next, the study relies on data from a single crowdfunding platform. There are a 
number of crowdfunding platforms, such as Indiegogo, Fundable, and Pledgemusic, and 
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each is tailored towards a specific mission. Also, crowdfunding platforms may vary in 
terms of both usage guidelines (e.g., some platforms require funding goals to be met for 
ventures to receive money, while others do not) and the overall cost of usage for 
entrepreneurs (e.g., platform and fund-processing fees). However, I believe that the 
similarities between platforms enable my results to be generalizable, particularly in terms 
of the underlying platform mission and funder-entrepreneur arrangements, both of which 
are generally standard across rewards-based platforms. Finally, I drew upon existing 
research to discern what status indicators might be relevant to the crowdfunding context. 
An examination of other possible status indicators may provide additional insights into 
how status influences entrepreneurs’ ability to obtain funding.  
Section 3: Implications and Future Research  
Limitations notwithstanding, my findings have valuable implications for both 
research and practice. Future research might expand on the current study by examining 
how social status and venture type may interact to influence funders’ support of 
underdogs. For example, funders may feel more confident in providing capital to a 
relatively uneducated entrepreneur operating within an industry that might require low-
levels of specific knowledge, such as art, as compared to a knowledge intensive industry 
such as technology. In a related vein, scholars might also examine the underdog effect at 
varying investment levels and reward types. Past research has found that individuals 
often ‘abandon’ underdogs in scenarios where consequence are high (Kim et al.. 2008). 
While it would seem that both factors are generally low in crowdfunding, both could 
potentially increase at higher investment levels. For example, the consequence of losing a 
$500 investment (e.g., if the entrepreneur fails to deliver on a promised reward) is likely 
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much larger than the consequence of providing (and potentially losing) $5. To examine 
this, scholars might test funders’ degree of underdog support at varying reward levels for 
the same venture.   
Given the central role played by entrepreneurial narratives in crowdfunding, 
future research might explore how the overall tone of the entrepreneurial narrative 
influences the underdog effect. Given that underdogs are, by definition, at a disadvantage 
and expected to lose, it seems likely that an underdog narrative may often take on a 
negative tone. Extant research suggests that negative tone my decrease the liklihood that 
others will cooperate (Hecht and LaFrance, 1995) and lead others to develop a negative 
perception of the speaker (Dillard and Peck, 2000; Nan, 2008). Alternatively, positive 
tone use is generally associated with positive outcomes. For example, positive tone in an 
entrepreneur’s communication may reflect optimism in areas such as future earnings, 
and, in turn, increase the willingness of investors to provide money (e.g., Davis, Piger, & 
Sedor, 2012; Loughran & McDonald, 2011). Taken together, it seems possible that an 
overall negative tone may reduce underdog support in funders, while an overall positive 
tone may increase the liklihood of underdog support. Researchers might examine this in 
an experimental setting by having participants read, and evaluate, underdog 
entrepreneurial narratives that contain varying levels of positive and negative tone.  
Next, researchers might extend the current study by examining other forms of 
underdog status indicators. Further, this work might also take a qualitative approach to 
garner a more ‘fine grained’ picture of status. For example, when pitching the venture 
Kioky, founder Guy Richards described his efforts as “what we have here is a David and 
Goliath story….we really want to bring this product to market.” Such a statement may 
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resonate with potential funders and perhaps increase their likelihood to provide support. 
However, given its relative complexity, this influence may not be accounted for in studies 
that employ other methods of analysis such as CATA (as in the current study).  
Finally, given the lack of financial rewards and repayment expectations in both 
crowdfunding and grant-based funding, future research might examine the role of social 
status in determining entrepreneur success in government-backed programs such as 
SBIR. The Small Business Innovation Research Program (SBIR) is a public/private 
partnership in the United States which provides financial grants to fund R&D conducted 
by private organizations. In line with this function, the stated purpose of the SBIR 
program is to promote R&D in the private sector and aide in the commercialization of 
federally funded research (Link & Scott, 2012). Unlike many traditional funding conduits 
(as well as crowdfunding), SBIR provides grants at a relatively large variety of funding 
levels. For example, as of 2010 the maximum funding levels for stage one and stage two 
grant awards were $150, 000 and $1,000,000 respectively. Due to this flexibility, SBIR 
provides capital to a relatively large number of ventures in the United States, a fact which 
is highlighted by the program’s yearly funding totals which equaled roughly $2 billion in 
2005 alone (Link & Scott, 2012). Despite the relatively large capital outlays provided by 
the SBIR, the conduit may be ripe for the existence of the underdog effect given both the 
non-profit nature of the program and the separation of ownership between the investors 
and grant capital.  
From a practical standpoint, the inability of some entrepreneurs to access 
sufficient levels of external capital has long represented a key area of concern for both 
scholars and practitioners alike (e.g., Blanchard et al., 2008; Sage, 2013). My results 
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suggest that entrepreneurs attempting to garner capital through crowdfunding will tend to 
achieve higher levels of funding performance (in relation to their funding goals) when 
they belong to certain underdog status groups. Further, my research also suggests that 
entrepreneurs who often face lower barriers in traditional funding contexts, such as 
Caucasian males, are likely to obtain lower levels of support from prospective funders. 
Moreover, my findings underscore the potential importance of crowdfunding platforms in 
fostering entrepreneurial growth amongst traditionally excluded groups. Entrepreneurship 
represents the engine that drives the global economy; and, as such, the inability of some 
entrepreneurs to successfully access needed funds may have far reaching economic 
implications. Indeed, insufficient levels of capitalization during the startup phase may 
lead to relatively low-levels of venture growth and performance (Alsos et al., 2006).  
My research also suggests the need for ‘fit’ between entrepreneurs/ventures and 
crowdfunding platforms. Popular media has highlighted the growing role of women and 
ethnic minorities within crowdfunding in recent years (Overly, 2013; Thorpe, 2014). 
However, the cultural norms of a given context, such as underdog support in 
crowdfunding, are created over time and often evolve through subsequent iterations 
(Axelrod 1986; Bettenhausen & Murnighan, 1985). Given that crowdfunding platforms 
often vary both in terms of mission and funder demographic, the extent to which certain 
underdog entrepreneurs are supported may vary by platform. For example, entrepreneurs 
involved in an underdog industry such as art may benefit from using the Kickstarter 
platform due to its focus on creativity. Alternatively, entrepreneurs who are not 
underdogs may be better served by a platform such as Indiegogo given its more general 
focus on supporting entrepreneurship.   
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 Social exclusion and the influence of underdog psychology represent valuable, yet 
relatively understudied areas of interest within the context of entrepreneurship and 
specifically entrepreneurial finance. While past research has generally focused on how 
the communication of ‘top dog’ status influences the resource allocation decisions of 
traditional investors, I find that in some instances, resource providers respond favorably 
to underdog social status. I believe that these results should broaden the perspectives of 
both scholars and practitioners alike regarding the value resource providers place on a 
given social status in various funding contexts.  
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LIST OF TABLES 
 
 
 
 
 
TABLE 1 
Summary of Words Used for Computer Aided Text Analysis (CATA) 
 
Underdog-language: 
 
amateur, burden, burdens, burdensome, cheat, cheated, corrupt, corruption, deny, denied, desperation, desperate, 
difficulty, difficulties, difficult, disadvantage, disadvantaged, disadvantages, discourage, discouraging, discouraged, 
discriminate, discriminated, discriminating, discrimination, distress, distressed, excluded, exclude, exclusion, 
exclusionary, fail, fails, failure, failed, failures, hardship, hardships, helpless, hostile, hostility, impoverished, 
improbable, improbability, inadequate, inadequacies, incapable, indie, independent, independently, inexperienced, 
longshot, meager, minority, minorities, obstacle, obstacles, oppressed, oppress, oppression, poor, poverty, racism, racist, 
racists, repression, repress, repressed, risk, risks, risky, risked, risking, self-finance, self-financing, self-financed, self-
fund, self-funded, setback, setbacks, sexism, sexist, small, smallest, smaller, struggle, threat, threatened, threatening, 
threaten, uncontrollable, underdog, underdogs, unexpected, unfairness, unfair, unjust, unknown, unlikely, unlikelihood, 
uphill, weak, weakness  
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TABLE 2 
Descriptive Statistics and Variable Intercorrelations 
            
Variable  Mean         SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
 
1. Funding Performance 
  
91.17 
 
113.55 
        
2. Gender (female)   0.26   0.44  .10        
3. Ethnicity: African Americ.   0.7   0.25 -.09   .02       
4. Ethnicity: Hispanic   0.05   0.22         -.02   .11      -.06      
5. Ethnicity: Asian   0.09   0.29     .15**   .04      -.09  -.07     
6. Educational Attainment   0.93   0.26  .02  -.03       .02   .06  -.04    
7. Functional Experience   0.17   0.38 -.09  -.01       .02  -.02  -.06  .03   
8. Underdog Industry   0.79   0.41  .02  .08 .07   .04  -.06  .11 -.05  
9. Underdog Language   0.26   0.63          .12* -.03      -.07   .03 -.04  .10  .01 .10 
N= 300; ** = p < .01, * = p < .05 
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Table 3 
Hierarchical Linear Regression Results for Entrepreneurs’ Underdog Social Status and Funding Performance 
Variables  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Control Variables      
Census region 1          0.049           0.053      0.030       0.034 
Census region 2          0.127*           0.100╬      0.131*       0.106╬ 
Census region 3          0.005           0.018      0.004       0.017 
Census region 4          0.134**           0.132*      0.148**       0.149** 
Census region 5          0.029           0.048      0.023       0.043 
Census region 6           0.008           0.014      0.008       0.014 
Census region 7          0.038           0.032      0.026       0.022 
Census region 8         -0.045          -0.034     -0.051      -0.039 
Funded 2009         -0.005          -0.003     -0.021      -0.008 
Funded 2010         -0.036          -0.028     -0.040      -0.032 
Funded2011         -0.007           0.002     -0.009       0.001 
Team size          0.160**    0.168**      0.143**       0.153** 
Commentary           0.488**    0.492**      0.513**       0.512** 
      
Independent Variables      
Underdog education             0.001       -0.021 
Underdog experience            -0.066       -0.058 
Underdog gender      0.121*        0.112* 
Underdog ethnicity:      
    African American            -0.067       -0.070 
    Hispanic            -0.012       -0.017 
    Asian     0.097╬        0.102* 
Underdog industry         0.133**       0.126* 
Underdog language         0.080       0.080╬ 
      
F-Ration    9.944**     8.013**      9.805**        7.917** 
R2           0.312 0.353      0.336        0.375 
Adjusted R2           0.281 0.309      0.301        0.328 
∆ Adjusted R2 (F Change)  --   2.427*      5.202**        4.890** 
N=300 **p < .01, *p < .05, ╬p < .10 
VITA 
 
Blakley Chase Davis 
 
Candidate for the Degree of  
 
Doctor of Philosophy 
 
Dissertation: Rooting for the Underdog: The Influence of Social Status on Capital 
Allocation Decisions in Crowdfunding 
 
Major Field: Entrepreneurship  
 
Biographical: 
 
 Education: 
 
Completed the requirements for the Doctor of Philosophy in Business    
Administration (entrepreneurship) at Oklahoma State University, Stillwater, 
Oklahoma in May 2015. 
 
Completed the requirements for the Master of Business Admin. at Texas Tech 
University, Lubbock, Texas, 2011.  
 
Completed the requirements for the Bachelor of Business Admin. in 
management at Texas Tech University, Lubbock, Texas, 2008.  
 
Publications: 
 
Allison, T. H., Davis, B. C., Short, J. C., & Webb, J. W. (2014). 
Crowdfunding in a prosocial microlending environment: Examining the role 
of intrinsic versus extrinsic cues. Entrepreneurship Theory & Practice, 39, 
53-73.  
 
Morris, M. H., Davis, B. C., Mills, A., Pitt, L. F., & Berthon, P. (2013). 
Opportunities and the entrepreneurial marketer. In Sethna Z, Jones R, 
Harrigan P (Eds.). Entrepreneurial marketing: Global perspectives (pp. 127-
146). Bingley, UK: Emerald 
 
Professional Memberships:  
 
Academy of Management  
Strategic Management Society  
